Clausewitzean Ideas of War and how they Relate to Present Conflicts

Clausewitzean Ideas of War and how they Relate to Present Conflicts

As I am getting ready to begin the final class for my MA and complete my Thesis I have been re-reading Clausewitz and his ideas and theory of War.   One of the things that that has struck me the most and made me realize how much Clausewitz is misunderstood is the way in which his most famous quote from the book about how “War is the continuation of policy by other means”[1] is completely taken out of context in most history.

If you read his book further, and I assume that most generals, staff chiefs, and even military historians have then it is clear that this quote is just a starting point given the numerous caveats and expansions on that simple statement in his theory.   Indeed, the very section that this quote heads explains what he means in a very concise and unambiguous manner; it is worth quoting in full.  

“We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.   What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means.   War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means.   That of course, is no small demand; but however much it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them.   The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.”[2]

The last sentence is critical for an understanding of what Clausewitz means when he speaks of war.   He is not making the claim that war exists in a vacuum and that once war starts politics takes a back seat as some people seem to believe.   It is clear that the Clausewitzean ideal of war is that it is a tool in the political leadership’s kit when they engage in diplomacy, indeed it the ultimate diplomatic act.   It can be argued that in the Clausewitzean view of the world war, or the threat of war, backs up every act of political intercourse between nations.

The relationship between politics and war is not the most important thing about Clausewitzean theory to understand for the military historian though; that is the relationship or definition he gave for the object of war itself.   Clausewitz says of the enemy in war that “the fighting force must be destroyed: that is, they must be put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight.”[3] (italics in original)  Note that this does necessarily call for the physical destruction of the enemy army, only that they can no longer fight.   He goes on to specifically state that often the physical destruction of enemy forces is actually contrary to the political policy underlying the causes for war in the first place.

This leads us directly into a discussion of means and ends in war.   It follows that if war is a political act, which it undoubtedly is and that the political objectives define the goals for war is waged; then the means to be employed should be tailored to achieving the ends with minimal waste and expenditure consistent with the ability of the combatants.   Therefore, any undertaking of war should factor in the available means with the political objective.   A practical application would be that if the conquest of a province is the goal then it is only necessary to conquer and maintain that province to achieve war aims or that if political concessions were the goal then only that amount of force needed to get the enemy to capitulate and grant those concessions would be required.

That brings me to present conflicts and an analysis of present world conflicts in light of Clausewitzean theory.   Present conflicts are not just the hot wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; they include the long simmering conflict between the two Koreas that was highlighted by the North Korean shelling of a South Korean island yesterday and lastly the ongoing “War against International Terrorism.”  I will discuss each conflict in turn.

Iraq is no longer really a hot war following the successful 2008-2009 surge of mostly American troops there that coupled with intense political efforts led the local support for insurgents to dry up.   There are probably lessons to be learned there that could be applied in Afghanistan although at present it appears that the US is attempting to simply import methods that worked in Iraq to Afghanistan without accounting for local and cultural differences between the two countries.

However, the argument could be made that the US strictly applied Clausewitzean principles when developing the strategy used in Iraq.  The political goal for the Iraq war was a sustainable parliamentary democracy in an Iraq that would not provide funding or safe harbor from terrorists.   The levels of force used by the US coupled with the political support given to the government seem to have achieved this goal although the jury will be out for at least several decades given the history of successful democracy, or lack thereof, in the Middle East.

The war in Afghanistan is a different animal entirely.   The cultural factors are completely different from relatively culturally homogenous Iraq.   The US appears to be trying to do the exact same thing in Afghanistan that they did in Iraq.   A policy that is probably doomed to fail because of the cultural climate.   It is almost as though there is a cookie cutter approach to strategy.   Iraq is Muslim; Afghanistan is Muslim what worked in Iraq must therefore work in Afghanistan.

Additionally the ends and means calculation must take into account the much more logistically austere environment in Afghanistan; it is simply not possible to sustain the large numbers of ground troops required to successfully implement an Iraq style strategy the lines of supply just are not there.   I do not doubt that eventually a winning strategy can be found, but whether one will be found depends on the will and staying power of the American people, who can at times be fickle.

The conflict between the Korea’s is another example where Clausewitzean theory is applicable although perhaps not in a way that many people might think.   The situation on the Korean peninsula is strange because it is one in which the 1950-53 Korean war has not officially ended, yet a state of war even one at a low level exists that is subject to spikes in the hostility level based on the actions of the two protagonists.   In genera it is North Korea that sparks armed confrontation either overtly or covertly and they do so to achieve specific, although sometimes opaque to outside observers, goals.   There is a great degree of calculation of both means to ends and the use of military force to achieve those ends consistent with the degree of means and likelihood of success.   The political dimension is that at some point North Korean provocations will reach a point at which the South Koreans feel they have no choice but to ramp up the level of military response consistent with their own political objectives.   That level was almost reached this past spring with the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel.   The artillery bombardment of yesterday may tip the South Koreans over the line and cause them to administer a good slap to NK to demonstrate the South’s technical and tactical superiority to NK forces.   The situation in Korea bears watching.


[1] Carl von Clausewitz. On War. Translated by Peter Paret and Michael Howard. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976. P. 87

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid. p. 91

5 thoughts on “Clausewitzean Ideas of War and how they Relate to Present Conflicts”

  1. OK, I just read Our COIN doctrine removes the enemy from the essence of war by COL Gentile and I have to say that he is saying the same thing in his article that I have been saying for the past few years. The difference is that he is a COL and I am a SFC so he somewhat gets listened to. He is not the only person in the army saying this, I know plenty of fellow soldiers saying the same things; none of us are in a position to really change anything though.

    I can also see how you would believe that I misunderstand the role of Clausewitzean theory and the Iraq war based on these thoughts. I still respectfully disagree though. Clausewitz is clearly applicable because his theory regards how war is waged and not how the political goals or strategy, if you will, are decided upon.

  2. “The political goal for the Iraq war was a sustainable parliamentary democracy in an Iraq that would not provide funding or safe harbor from terrorists.”

    This isn’t a political view? Your politics are obvious.

    “I also do not understand why you would show up and slam my post and then fail to respond when I answer your comment. At least in a real drive-by or combat I would have the chance to shoot back.”

    This obviously was not your first response . . . which you posted seven hours after mine? . . . so you are assuming interactions in real time? I’m in Europe, where are you? This isn’t the way that thoughtful blogs work, interactions take place sometimes over a period of days and comments should not be off the cuff, rather thought out, don’t you think?

    “Drive-by”? Well, that allows you to ignore my main points doesn’t it? You reduce it to denying that your analysis reflects your political view, which to me it obviously does, and then don’t even respond to Bacevich’s or Gentile’s views of the surge which are completely contrary to yours . . .

    Actually I agree with most of what you posted in regards to CvC, I would not have commented if I didn’t think you had a handle on his thought, since explaining him becomes too tedious. But my comment was constructive in that most are blind to their own politics which can come out in their (especially Clausewitzian) analysis. Your missing the enhanced situation of Iran as a result of the botched Iraq war is an indication of this as well . . .

    • €œThe political goal for the Iraq war was a sustainable parliamentary democracy in an Iraq that would not provide funding or safe harbor from terrorists.€
      That is not my opinion but the stated goal of the Bush administration, at least as it eventually evolved. I actually don€™t have a dog in the fight over whether invading Iraq was the right thing to do or not. I am not familiar enough with either Bacevich or Gentiles work to comfortably comment on what they think. I will have to look them up before I get back to you. I am currently knee deep in writing my MA Thesis and so only blog on the side and then not as often as I would like.
      I will apologize and say that yes, I am still getting used to the asynchronous nature of blogging. I still did not expect a 5 day pause before an answer. And yes I combined two responses.

      Finally, I live in Germany not the States.

  3. I fail to see how you can deduce my political views from my post.

    I also do not understand why you would show up and slam my post and then fail to respond when I answer your comment. At least in a real drive-by or combat I would have the chance to shoot back. Thanks for the not so constructive criticism since in the end, criticism without debate is not really criticism.

    I am still scratching my head to figure out how you understand my politics based on this post, what exactly are my “Politics”?

    I would also argue that the military was indeed used to set the conditions for Democracy in Iraq. I also do not see how Iran comes out as the big winner if a sustainable Democracy is created on their border. My argument in favor of Clauewitzean analysis is that in the case of Iraq the Military was used to set the conditions to achieve the political goals of the conflict and the military was not used as an end in itself. One of the biggest fallacies about Clausewitz and On War in particular is that it advocates some sort of wag the dog type of military-political relationship when that is emphatically not the case, Clausewitz continually argues that war is a means to achieve policy and not an end in itself.

  4. “Iraq is no longer really a hot war following the successful 2008-2009 surge of mostly American troops there that coupled with intense political efforts led the local support for insurgents to dry up. ”

    “However, the argument could be made that the US strictly applied Clausewitzean principles when developing the strategy used in Iraq. The political goal for the Iraq war was a sustainable parliamentary democracy in an Iraq that would not provide funding or safe harbor from terrorists. ”

    Sorry Patrick, but I think you’re way off on this. You’re attempting to use Clausewitz to reinforce your own political views, not as a means of analysis. To start with how exactly would the use of the military instrument be able to establish a “sustainable parliamentary democracy” in Iraq? Democracy requires institutions which are established and maintained by a political community sustained by commonly held democratic values, neither of which is achievable by outside military force.

    Following a Clausewitzian analysis which would look at the current balance of power in the region, refer to Book VI, Ch 6 of On War, Iran comes out as the big winner in Bush’s war, not the US. The “surge” as part of much larger series of events only marked a drop off in the Iraqi civil war, but has not brought about any lasting stability. Gian Gentile has argued this well, but Andrew Bacevich, who is perhaps the most read Clausewitzian today, has made the most powerful argument in “Washington Rules” as to what has not been achieved . . . His tone reflects the seriousness of the situation.

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