Book Review: The Age of Total War: 1860-1945 by Jeremy Black

The notion that a book is “thought-provoking” is often thrown out there for works of non-fiction, and of those that are described as such that I have read most very seldom are.  This book is different, Dr. Black has written not so much a history as a treatise challenging historians, particularly military historians, to reexamine the history of conflict in the examined period with the idea of total war uppermost in their minds.  It seems a counter-intuitive thing to do at first, but he provides plenty of examples of why the wars under consideration were not total or were only partially total at best.  This includes World War II, which was total in some aspects but limited in others.

The biggest distinction the Dr. Black makes in discussing totality in warfare is the difference between war aims/victory conditions and the methods used to wage war.  He posits that while war aims are sometimes total, such as seeking the destruction of the enemy or the dissolution of their state, the methods of war making have often been far from total.  Even the most brutal of wars between nation states are often not total as the combatants do not actually seek the physical destruction of their enemies.  He actually points out that it is most often revolutionary or sectarian conflicts where the physical destruction of opponents is a goal and uses the examples of Rwanda in 1994, 1990′s Bosnia, the German suppression of the Herero in the early 1900s, and many of the wars of decolonization in Africa and East Asia as examples, many of which fall outside of the period examined.

This is a global history of the period to an extent, but there is an emphasis on wars that occurred within Europe simply because so much more is known about them.  He examines the conditions in these wars and discusses the ways in which they were and were not total.  On of his most interesting discussions in the book is a wide-ranging discussion of fighting quality in his chapter on WWII and the way in which that aspect of the war has been under served in the literature.

He closes the book with a discussion of totality in the Cold War period and looking forward and the way in which the entire concept of total war needs to be reexamined and that military history needs to get away from just examining the wars of Europe but also look at the rest of the world.  It is a telling observation that in English language history’s the rest of the world is virtually ignored unless a western nation was engaged in the conflict with Israel being the exception.

In closing, Dr. Black has produced a book that should inspire even the most casual of students of military history to reevaluate the way in which they think of total war.  This book should be on the shelf of every student of military history but particularly that of those talking heads that go on news shows and fatuously offer their supposed wisdom about warfare for the masses.  An excellent and yes, thought provoking book, I highly recommend it.

Photo Essay – Langenbruck Cemetery – Rose Barracks, Vilseck Germany

There is an old German cemetery on Rose Barracks that I have driven past hundreds of times and never stopped to look at. I finally did today and was surprised. I thought it was a military cemetery like the POW cemetery in Grafenwohr but it is not. It is a village cemetery from one of the villages that was moved when the training area was established in the early 20th century. There are several other abandoned villages on Grafenwohr Training Area, most of them are inside the impact area and off limits, there is one other in the maneuver area that still has the shell of a church and has been a reference point that anyone who has ever trained at Graf knows about. Ask anyone who trained at Graf about the Hofenohe Church and they have probably walked through the ruins.

The Cemetery on Rose Barracks is for the village of LangenBruck. As the information panel states, the village dates back to 905. Someone visits the cemetery as there were candles on several of the graves and some of the graves have what looks to be fairly new headstones on them.

I will post the photos below with short explanatory captions.  The photos are compressed due to their large size but if anyone wants the original photos email me and I will be happy to send you a copy of the originals.

Information panel at entrance to the cemetery.

There are more photos below the fold.

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The Campaign in Central Mexico 1847-1848: In Search of Decision

After the northern campaign of General Zachary Taylor (1784-1850), failed to force the Mexican government to sue for peace, President James Polk (1795-1849) decided on an invasion of central Mexico with the goal of capturing Mexico City.  The planning for an invasion of central Mexico was the brainchild of General Winfield Scott (1786-1866), who prepared a series of three memorandums laying out the case for the operation, which he sent to President Polk in October 1846.[1]

Scott had desired a command of his own since the beginning of the war and he felt slighted that he had not been given command of the force in northern Mexico.  Scott was suspicious that he was kept from command for political reasons since Polk was a Democrat and Scott a Whig.  He was correct to be suspicious for these were exactly the reasons that Scott was denied command at the outset.  General Taylor was a Democrat who was deemed politically reliable although he secretly coveted the presidency, something a successful campaign would help him achieve.

The invasion of central Mexico was planned in detail and would require twenty-thousand troops, 50 transports, and 141 flatboats to land the troops after they reached Veracruz.[2] The flatboats were to be constructed in New Orleans and General Scott sent the Quartermaster General Thomas S. Jesup (1788-1860) to ensure they were constructed properly.  In the end, only 65 boats were available for the landings due the time necessary for their construction.

The landings at Veracruz began on 9 March 1847 and on 25 March, the Mexican garrison began negotiations for surrender after taking a terrible pounding from American artillery and dismounted naval guns.  The surrender was completed on 27 March, General Scott granted generous terms to the Mexicans, they were required to surrender all their arms and military equipment but the soldiers were paroled and in addition, the Americans guaranteed the security of the civilian population.[3]

The threat of Yellow Fever, which was endemic in Veracruz, General Scott determined begin his march inland as quickly as possible.  The march route would follow the National Road to Mexico City via Jalapa rather than the Orizaba road because the former was in better repair.  The Mexicans were not standing still, General Antonio Lopez de Santa Ana (1794-1876) had returned to Mexico City after his defeat at Buena Vista and immediately assembled another army to oppose Scott upon learning of the surrender of Veracruz.

Santa Ana, with an army of 12,000 men met the Americans at Cerro Gordo on 18 April and was defeated; resulting in the virtual destruction of the Mexican army but Santa Ana escaped on horseback and returned to Mexico City to prepare its defenses.  General Scott continued to march until he reached the city of Puebla where he was forced to stop and await reinforcements because most of the volunteer regiments in the army had completed their one year of service and wished to return home.  The American army would remain in Puebla until September when sufficient reinforcements had arrived to begin the march on Mexico City.

The American assault on Mexico City began on 14 August 1847 and over the next two days; the Americans defeated all Mexican forces on the approach to the city and had effectively bottled up the Mexican army in the city itself.  In order to avoid a costly attack on the walls of the city General Scott halted his army three miles outside Mexico City and offered a truce to General Santa Ana in order for armistice negotiations to begin.  An armistice was concluded on 24 august but it was to be short-lived.  Armistice negotiations began the next day and the both sides presented their demands.  The negotiations continued until 6 September when the Mexican delegation announced that they could not acceded to the American demands and General Scott angrily terminated the armistice citing Mexican treachery.[4]

The final assault on Mexico City began on 8 September 1847 and in a series of bloody engagements, the American forces advanced until they had captured two of the city’s gates by 14 September.  As the American army was preparing for the final assault on the city itself, the mayor surrendered the city, General Santa Ana having fled the night of the thirteenth.

The Fall of Mexico City

General Santa Ana resigned the presidency shortly after the fall of Mexico City the moderate Manuel de la Pena y Pena (1789-1850) replaced him as Mexican president.  The new government began negotiations for the end of the war with Nicholas Trist (1800-1874) who had been dispatched by the President Polk with the authority to negotiate for peace.

Negotiations for a permanent peace dragged on through the Christmas holidays because of uncertainty on the part of the Mexican government.  The final details were hammered out in January 1848 and a final treaty of peace was signed at Guadalupe Hidalgo on 2 February 1848, which ended the war.  The United States was given the territory that makes up the states of New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada, and Utah in addition to paying Mexico $15,000,000 and assuming responsibility for all American claims against the Mexican government.

The campaign in central Mexico was decisive in bringing an early conclusion to the war.  It is likely that if General Scott had not invaded central Mexico and captured the Mexican capital that the war would have ended very differently.  General Santa Ana had shown a remarkable ability to reconstruct armies after suffering defeat.  It was the capture of Mexico City that caused Santa Ana to resign the Mexican presidency, which allowed a moderate to come to power.

 

 

Bibliography

Brooks, Nathan C., A Complete History of the Mexican War: Its Causes Conduct, and Consequences: Comprising an Account of the Various Military and Naval Operations.  From its Commencement to Treaty of Peace, Cranbury, NJ: The Scholars Bookshelf, 2006

Eisenhower, John S.D., Agent of Destiny: The Life and Times of General Winfield Scott, New York: The Free Press, 1997.

Singletary, Otis A., The Mexican War, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960

Endnotes

[1] Eisenhower, John S.D. So Far From God:  The U.S. War with Mexico, 1846-1848, p. 253

[2] Ibid. p. 254

[3] Brooks, N.C. A Complete History Mexican War: Its Causes, Conduct, and Consequences: Comprising and Account of the Various Military and Naval Operations from its Commencement to the Treaty of Peace. First published in 1849, reprinted by: Cranbury, NJ: The Scholar’s Bookshelf, 2006, pp. 310-312

[4] Singletary, Otis. The Mexican War, p. 93

BOOK REVIEW: Civilization: The West and the Rest by Niall Ferguson

I have read several of Niall Ferguson’s books and while I may not always agree with him hi writing style and analysis are always interesting and thought provoking.  Civilization: The West and the Rest is no different.  I have the UK edition of the book, I doubt it is significantly different from the US edition except for the cover, but cannot guarantee it.

In this book Dr. Ferguson attempts to analyze and explain why the West, which he defines as European and countries with a European heritage, has prospered so much over the past 500 years and how the West managed to control so much of the globe.  He does this by identifying what he calls the Six ‘Killer Apps’ of western civilization.  They are:

  1. Competition
  2. Science
  3. Property
  4. Medicine
  5. Consumption
  6. Work[1]

It is these six apps that he credits with making the West so successful over the past half millennium.  He analyzes each in detail and it is both entertaining and illuminating to read.  Not only does he describe what each app did and does but he talks about the how and why each app was so successful and if the West still has those properties.

He also provides some profound insights into why the west currently seems to be in a period of decay.  One of the best I read was “Maybe the ultimate threat to the West comes not from Radical Islam, or any other external source, but from our own lack of understanding of, and faith in, our own cultural heritage.”[2]  The other discussion of his I found particularly compelling was his analysis of the unique dangers of the current trend of moral and cultural relativism in Western thought.  His basic premise is that if Westerners lose sight of the heritage: “All we risk being left with are a vacuous consumer society and a culture of relativism – a culture that says any theory or opinion, no matter how outlandish, is just as good as whatever it was we used to believe in.”[3]  that analysis that goes into those two insights alone make this book worth reading.

Dr. Ferguson has done it again with Civilization: The West and the Rest and come out with another book of history that informs the reader not just about the past, but puts that path into a perspective that makes it extremely worthwhile for the contemporary world.  I highly recommend this outstanding work by one of the best historians writing today.

 


[1] Ferguson, Niall. Civilization: The West and the Rest. (London, UK, Allen Lane Publishing. 2010), 12

[2] Ibid, 255

[3] Ibid, 288

 

Book Review: The Face of Battle by John Keegan

I have to caveat this review somewhat.  I wrote this book review for an undergrad military history course I took almost six-years ago.  I still think that the The Face of Battle is an excellent book.  I have modified my opinion of Keegan as a historian somewhat though.  I think he is somewhat overrated and he tends to simplistic British-centric judgements in his analysis of military history.  He is a good historian, but sometimes his interpretations of events are not all they could be.

“The Face of Battle” by John Keegan has become a classic in the thirty years since it was published.  The book is an attempt to examine three historical battles from the point if view of the participants: Agincourt-1415, Waterloo-1815, and The Somme-1916.  All the battles are chosen as representing the archetype of the battles of the period as well as being well documented.

He begins the book by defining the parameters of what he is trying to accomplish.  He defines a battle as not just fighting or small scale skirmishing but a fight that “must obey the dramatic unities of time, place, and action.”  The most defining point being the action “which is directed towards securing a decision by and through those means, on the battlefield and within a fairly strict time limit”- thus at one strike he limits his subject to preclude most of the combat fought throughout history, the set-piece battle being fairly rare.

Keegan takes issue with the conventional study of military history as being too dogmatic and not more liberal in mode of thought.  That is a criticism that holds true today in much contemporary military history.  Similarly, Keegan is at pains to show that the methods in which military history is written have sound and compelling arguments given the target audience of those histories.  The largest point that Keegan makes is that the conventional battle piece history is insufficient to accurately describe the behavior of large masses of men in what is arguably one of the most stressful situations a person could ever find himself in.  He decries the mass description of behavior that while it may be typical of most participants is not typical of all.  He examines the types of history written and concludes that while there is much collective history there has not been enough attention paid to the individual and their experiences in war.

He analyses the individual’s experience of battle by breaking the battle down into its component parts.  He describes the campaign and battle itself then further subdivides it by describing the type of combat based on soldier and weapon archetypes.  He finally describes the aftermath of battle and how the participants coped with it.

The first battle described in the book is the Battle of Agincourt, which took place in northern France on October 25, 1415 as part of the Hundred Years War between England and France.  The scene is set by a short description of the campaign leading up to the battle and a concise narrative of the battle itself.  He begins his battle analysis by detailing some of the deficiencies in the available sources and what assumptions he has made to make up for these deficiencies in information.

The battle is broken down according to type of combat for analysis.  The combats he discusses are archer versus infantry and cavalry, cavalry versus infantry, and infantry versus infantry.  Keegan attempts to recreate the conditions under which each combat occurred and give the modern reader some idea of what it must have been like to be in the battle.

The analysis is full of descriptive phrases that paint a picture of what the experience of medieval battle was like.  Another element of his battle description that sets his writing apart from other battle narratives is Professor Keegan’s use and explanation of the technical terms describing how he reaches his conclusions on the way the battle was fought.

Keegan makes a specific point of logically scrutinizing the king’s order to execute the prisoners when he feared a French resumption of the attack.  He then describes how the battle ended with Henry’s summoning of the French and English heralds to fix a name for the battle.  Then he describes how the wounded were cared for and what the prognosis for the different type of wounds was.  He finalizes his account of the battle by discussing the will to combat of the soldiers of the Middle Ages.

Keegan jumps four hundred years of history to his next battle description, that of Waterloo between the Allied armies and the French under Napoleon on June 18, 1815.  Waterloo was the culminating battle of over twenty years of continental warfare dating to the French revolution in 1789, it was to define an age and usher in era of European peace that would last for fifty years.

His treatment of the Battle of Waterloo is roughly the same as his treatment of Agincourt though here he distinguishes between more weapon types than were present at Agincourt.  The types of combat Keegan relates at Waterloo are single combat, cavalry versus cavalry, cavalry versus infantry, cavalry versus artillery, artillery versus infantry, and infantry versus infantry.  While some engagements are the same, the type and nature of combat was completely altered due to the weapons used.

Keegan makes much of the fact that wounds suffered at waterloo were likely to be much graver than wounds received at Agincourt.  He also points out that though there was medical care available it was almost exactly the opposite of what would be prescribed in modern times.

Another large difference is in the number of soldiers engaged there were close to 100,000 troops on both sides at Waterloo compared to a maximum of 30,000 total engaged at Agincourt.  This increased the size of the battlefield though the battle was still substantially over after the first day.

The last battle the Keegan examines is the First Battle of the Somme from June to November 1916 and only June 1, 1916 the first day of the battle is examined in detail.  This battle is also described using the same basic format as Agincourt and Waterloo.  There are two types of combat discussed, infantry versus machine-gunners, and infantry versus infantry; though a case could be made that infantry versus artillery should be included as a distinct type and not just discussed in the passages leading to the battle description.

Throughout his description and analysis of the battle, he repeatedly points out the horrifying nature of trench warfare.  He describes the plight of the wounded caught in no-mans land and contrasts that with the experience of the wounded that made it to a casualty clearing station.

The final section of the book is concerned with the future of battle in warfare and Keegan’s assertion that the modern battlefield has become too lethal a place for man to exist upon it.  This is the only part of the book that is open to criticism.  Here Keegan has fallen into the historian’s trap of trying to predict the future.  Nobody knows what the future may bring except the certainty that it will be different.  It has been predicted for sixty years that nuclear weapons would make war obsolete and humanity has continued to prove that it will still fight.  It can be said with certainty that war will change and may even change in a fundamental way but it is an excess of hubris to think that man will not find a way to fight as long as he thinks that doing so may gain some advantage.

In summation “The Face of Battle” is an excellent piece of research in the nature and experience of the common man at war.  I would highly recommend it to anyone who would like to get an appreciation for what combat is like.  I disagree that there is a qualitative difference between set piece battle and small-scale conflict the emotions and experience of the common soldier are essentially the same during combat itself.  The difference lies in the period between combat actions where I would argue that it is more stressful to be in small-scale conflict when combat can happen at anytime as compared to set piece battles where combat can be somewhat anticipated.