If you are a history geek like me, and I assume you are because you are reading the blog, then here is a project that should be interesting. In the late 90’s and early 00’s there was a much bandied statistic floating around that 1,000 World War II vets died every day. If that number were true then it is probably not true anymore because there probably are not enough World War II vets left to keep dying in those numbers for very long.
One thing that modern technology allows is to capture the memories of individual and put them into a form accessible to both the public and historians. One project like that is the Veteran’s History Project by the Library of Congress. What this project does is it “collects, preserves, and makes accessible the personal accounts of American war veterans so that future generations may hear directly from veterans and better understand the realities of war.” The project makes all of this material available through its own website and includes not just narratives but also pictures and videos made by the veterans.
What is neat about this project is that it depends on non-historians to collect the material for it. The veterans themselves can submit their own stories or people who just want to preserve history can go out and interview vets for inclusion in the database. They have a VHP Field Kit that people can download to help guide them in their interviews of vets. I plan on filling one of the kits out with my own experiences and also interviewing my brother and father who are also both vets. My dad was in Vietnam and my brother was in Operation Desert Fox in 1990 while I was in both Bosnia in 1995 and Iraq 2004-2005.
This is a great project for history teachers to get involved in. Not only does it make the kids aware of the men and women who walk among them every day who put their lives on the line in service to the country, it also preserves the memories of the men and women for future generations. I can imagine finding and interviewing a vet being a pretty enlightening project for high school sophomores or juniors.
If you want to know what history looks like, particularly American history, from the perspective of someone who sees evil and nefarious dealings in just about every single action taken by the United States then this is the book for you. I never thought I would see the day when the Marshall Plan would be described as economic warfare but it is in this book and that is just one example. I found it difficult to suspend disbelief and finish this book but I managed to man up and do so. This is history of the Zinn School. That is, it is a history written by a person consumed with spite and self-loathing for the culture and nation that nurtured and created them.
There are several outrageous claims made throughout the book and they all essentially boil down to America was/is evil. Here are some examples:
The Point Blank campaign that destroyed communications infrastructure in occupied Europe prior to the Allied invasion on D-Day was purposely designed to kill as many civilians as possible and any industrial or strategic effects were secondary results at best. Richard Overy does a very good job of destroying this particular fanstasy in his recently published book, The Bombers and the Bombed.
The Marshall Plan was not designed to help rebuild Europe from the devastation of WWII, it was economic warfare against the Soviet Union and had nothing to do with helping anybody.
The Soviet land blockade of Berlin that led to the Berlin Airlift was a response to economic attacks by the West. Specifically, he claims it was a response to the West’s apparently malicious introduction of the Deutsche Mark into the Western occupied zones.
The North Korean’s were probably goaded into attacking the the South in 1950 by a speech by Dean Acheson. The subtext here is that the war would not have happened if it were not for the US.
He goes on and on ad nauseum about NSC-68 being evil and completely ignores the fact that the strategy of communist containment outlined in the document was ultimately the strategy that won the Cold War for the West. Of course, he thinks the West should not have won. If you take this book at face value you would come away believing that Communists the world over are/were a bunch of peaceful little boggles that were forced into being the brutish thugs who murdered their own people by the millions because of the evil machinations of the West. In this long story of the perfidy of the West the brutal Soviet crackdowns on satellite states are ignored and Soviet intervention elsewhere are always presented as being reasonable responses to Western aggression.
I would call this book a waste of paper but that is not strong enough. It is worthwhile in one respect though. If you can see beyond the banality and fake moralism it gives a pretty clear picture of the intense dislike of the modern American left for the United States. I found myself wondering, if the author finds America so evil why is he still here?The one thing that comes through clearly in the entire book is the author’s conviction that America and the wider West are the true Evil Empire and it is only if the West gives itself over to the modern left/progressive movement that we can hope to atone for the sin of our very existence. That all this comes from a de-frocked Catholic Priest should be no surprise.
I cannot recommend this book except as an excellent example of what infinitely biased history and twisted facts look like. Luckily I did not pay for it having borrowed it from my local library.
[FULL DISCLOSURE: I received my copy of this book free from the author. I was not paid for this review and the opinion expressed is purely my own]
The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War Over Europe 1940-1945 is one of those books that is going to end up a standard work for a long time to come. It is the single most comprehensive history of the Allied bombing of Germany and occupied Europe during WWII that I have seen since the strategic bombing survey published by the US government in the immediate post-war years.
I have a review copy of the book so the page counts may be a little different in the published version. The book itself is 561 pages with 78 pages of notes, a 26 pages bibliography, and an 18 page index. It is divided into six chapters. The first three chapters are a chronological account of the air war over Germany and the last three are thematic dealing with the logic of bombing and the campaigns in Italy and the occupied countries.
Every book about the war talks about the bombing campaign and most take for granted that it was effective at least partially in reducing Germany’s war-making ability. This book examines the war in detail and tries to establish the effectiveness, if any, of the Allied bombing offensive. The answer is mixed at best.
It has always struck me as odd that despite the expenditure of hundreds of tons of bombs and the devastation of the center and surrounding regions of most industrial towns in Germany, german war production continued to increase throughout the war. Indeed, the most productive war of the month in terms of number of tanks and aircraft constructed was march of 1945. Given that, how could it be said that the bombing campaign was successful as many historians and the leaders of the campaign claimed?
The point of bombing was not to kill civilians, but to reduce the war making capacity of Germany. What Dr. Overy makes clear is that while industrial capacity was negatively affected in the wake of many raids, what was lost was regained and then some so rapidly that production halts were temporary at best. he attributes this to two causes; one, bombing accuracy was abysmal, and two, the Germans were very good at repairing damage and getting production lines running again.
It was considered a good raid by the british if there bombs fell within 5 miles of the target and three Americans thought within 3 miles was good. Bombing accuracy was so bad because the bombers flew very high to avoid AA fire and in the case of the English, they flew at night. The lower the bombers flew, the more accurate they were but they also suffered horrendous losses at low altitude due to AA fire and German fighters.
Added to bombing inaccuracy, was the depth and responsiveness of the German Civil and Air Defense Systems. The Germans had a multitude of agencies tasked with dealing with raiding damage and the German people themselves pitched in to make things good. The striking thing is that the Germans could have been even more effective if they had streamlined their civil defense organizations and avoided having a plethora of agencies trying to do the same thing.
The story of the bombing of italy shows that where the germans were very good, the Italians were very bad and italian civilians suffered as a result. Of special interest is the discussion of the bombing of occupied countries and the response of the occupied people to the destruction and loss of life inherent in being bombed to get their freedom.
This is an outstanding book and I highly recommend it to anyone who thinks they are knowledgeable about the Allied Bombing campaign of WWII. The book dispels some myths and puts the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of strategic bombing in context to who the war was won and the Nazis defeated.
The Battle of Antietam is interesting for several reasons the most important of which for me is that it is the single bloodiest day in American military history. There have been bloodier battles in American wars but no single day matches the blood spilled on those Maryland fields that early day in 1862. The Union victory at Antietam, if you can call it a victory, also provided Abe Lincoln with the opportunity to promulgate the Emancipation Proclamation. An executive act that was totally unconstitutional but that he did anyway for domestic and foreign political reasons.
Antietam was the final battle of Lee’s first invasion of the North and while it was not a decisive battle it changed things because of what came after. If anything, from a purely tactical and operational standpoint the battle was a draw. Both sides essentially beat themselves bloody over a few square miles of Maryland territory that neither considered vital. The battle is only considered a Union victory because Lee took his army and left instead of renewing the fighting for a second day leaving the Army of the Potomac in possession of the battlefield.
The commander of the 75,000 man, six Corps strong Union Army of the Potomac was General George B. McClellan. He was opposed the 39,000 man two Corps Confederate Army of Northern Virginia commanded by General Robert E. Lee.
In the fall of 1862 following the Confederate victory at Second Manassas Lee decided to invade Maryland. There were several competing reasons for this decision. One was that it was thought that that best way to force the Union to a negotiated settlement was to inflict a defeat on Northern forces on northern soil. Another was the hope that by successfully taking the war to the North the Southern states could win foreign recognition and potentially aid. It was also believed that Maryland was the state still in the Union whose population was the most sympathetic to the southern cause. Lastly, Lee believed that by invading Maryland and threatening the capture of Washington D.C. he could force the Army of the Potomac under McClellan to accept battle on his terms.
The invasion began on 3 Sep. 1862 and almost immediately (McClellan was a notorious slowpoke) provoked a reaction from the Union forces garrisoned in and around Washington D.C.
There were several skirmishes and minor battles prior to the culminating battle of the campaign at Antietam. The most significant of these was Stonewall Jackson’s capture of the federal garrison and Arsenal at Harper’s Ferry on Sep. 15th. This was the largest surrender of Federal troops during the war and the loss of weapons was considerable. The Confederates captured roughly 13,000 small arms, 200 wagons, and 73 artillery pieces when they took the Arsenal.
In the days leading up to the battle McClellan was slowly gathering all the disparate forces of the Army of the Potomac together and began to converge them west of Frederick in the vicinity of Sharpsburg. By contrast Lee’s army straggled in from their scattered positions in Maryland on 15 & 16 Sep. but McClellan’s habitual caution allowed Lee the time to consolidate his position prior to the Union assault on the morning of the 17th.
The first engagements between the two armies was on the night of 16 Sep when the Federal I Corps (Hooker) encountered rebel pickets.
During the night the Federal XII Corps (Mansfield) moved up in support of I Corps.
At around 0600 on 17 Sep Hooker’s Corps advanced and attacked the Confederate Left in the area of the North and East Woods and the Cornfield that was held by Stonewall Jackson’s Corps. The attack was almost successful until Hooker’s Corps was hit in the flank by Hood’s division who drove off the Union attack. As the I Corps retreated Mansfield was told that he was needed to cover the broken I Corps or the battle was lost before it really began.
As the XII Corps moved up to the attack Mansfield, it’s commander was mortally wounded and confusion briefly reigned as the 1st Division commander established his command of the Corps
At 0800 the XII Corps finally got into the fight and after heavy combat took and held the Dunker Church area unsupported by other Federal troops.
At about 0830 the II Corps (Sumner) entered the battle passing through the area where I and XII Corps had been so severely handled by Jackson’s Corps earlier. As the II Corps advanced into the battered formation of Jackson’s Corps they were hit in the flank by Fresh troops Lee had sent from his right and last Confederate reserves who managed to halt the attack in and around the Dunker Church and Cornfield. The failed attack by II Corps ended the first phase of the battle.
In the afternoon Sumner wanted to attack the Confederate left again because he believed the Rebels were more badly damaged than him and with the reinforcements from VI Corps he had the chance to
crush the Confederate left. The matter was referred to McClellan who denied permission for the attack and probably squandered the Union’s best chance to decisively defeat Lee’s Army, which was exhausted of reserves. The IX Corps (Burnside) begins to enter the battle around the Burnside Bridge at approximately 1300. At 1600 the IX Corps attacks towards Sharpsburg but the attack falters as the Corps is attacked in the flank by the Division of A.P. Hill and falls back to the bridge by 1700. This was the last major Federal assault of the day and ended the battle although skirmishing continued.
On 18 September both armies remained in position and Lee considered renewing the battle but taking his own casualties and federal strength into account he instead stars withdrawing his army south. McLellan chose not to pursue the retreating Confederates out of a belief that Lee was falling back on significant reinforcements.
With 3,782 dead and a total of 22,000 casualties out of 114,000 troops engaged the Battle of Antietam was the single bloodiest day in the history of American Arms. The next costliest battle I can think of that took place on one day and is continually mentioned is the D-Day invasion of Normandy. At D-Day the US had roughly 1,400 dead and a further 3,500 wounded out of approximately 80,000 invasion troops. Casualties at Antietam were roughly 19% while at D-Day they were 4.5 % of troops engaged.
An afterword is that an image was captured at Antietam that was a rarity prior to WWI. Namely, Alexander Gardener captured an image of the battle as it was happening. If you look at the below image on the right side you can see Union cavalry lined up awaiting orders and on the left side you can see the infantry of both armies on the fighting wreathed in the smoke from artillery and their rifles. If you blow the image up you can even see a couple of places where guys are dragging casualties away from the line. Why this has not become an iconic image of the Civil War I have no idea.