[FULL DISCLOSURE: I received my copy of this book free from the author. I was not paid for this review and the opinion expressed is purely my own]
The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War Over Europe 1940-1945 is one of those books that is going to end up a standard work for a long time to come. It is the single most comprehensive history of the Allied bombing of Germany and occupied Europe during WWII that I have seen since the strategic bombing survey published by the US government in the immediate post-war years.
I have a review copy of the book so the page counts may be a little different in the published version. The book itself is 561 pages with 78 pages of notes, a 26 pages bibliography, and an 18 page index. It is divided into six chapters. The first three chapters are a chronological account of the air war over Germany and the last three are thematic dealing with the logic of bombing and the campaigns in Italy and the occupied countries.
Every book about the war talks about the bombing campaign and most take for granted that it was effective at least partially in reducing Germany’s war-making ability. This book examines the war in detail and tries to establish the effectiveness, if any, of the Allied bombing offensive. The answer is mixed at best.
It has always struck me as odd that despite the expenditure of hundreds of tons of bombs and the devastation of the center and surrounding regions of most industrial towns in Germany, german war production continued to increase throughout the war. Indeed, the most productive war of the month in terms of number of tanks and aircraft constructed was march of 1945. Given that, how could it be said that the bombing campaign was successful as many historians and the leaders of the campaign claimed?
The point of bombing was not to kill civilians, but to reduce the war making capacity of Germany. What Dr. Overy makes clear is that while industrial capacity was negatively affected in the wake of many raids, what was lost was regained and then some so rapidly that production halts were temporary at best. he attributes this to two causes; one, bombing accuracy was abysmal, and two, the Germans were very good at repairing damage and getting production lines running again.
It was considered a good raid by the british if there bombs fell within 5 miles of the target and three Americans thought within 3 miles was good. Bombing accuracy was so bad because the bombers flew very high to avoid AA fire and in the case of the English, they flew at night. The lower the bombers flew, the more accurate they were but they also suffered horrendous losses at low altitude due to AA fire and German fighters.
Added to bombing inaccuracy, was the depth and responsiveness of the German Civil and Air Defense Systems. The Germans had a multitude of agencies tasked with dealing with raiding damage and the German people themselves pitched in to make things good. The striking thing is that the Germans could have been even more effective if they had streamlined their civil defense organizations and avoided having a plethora of agencies trying to do the same thing.
The story of the bombing of italy shows that where the germans were very good, the Italians were very bad and italian civilians suffered as a result. Of special interest is the discussion of the bombing of occupied countries and the response of the occupied people to the destruction and loss of life inherent in being bombed to get their freedom.
This is an outstanding book and I highly recommend it to anyone who thinks they are knowledgeable about the Allied Bombing campaign of WWII. The book dispels some myths and puts the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of strategic bombing in context to who the war was won and the Nazis defeated.