Book Review: The Age of Total War: 1860-1945 by Jeremy Black

Posted on October 5, 2011 by Patrick Shrier

The notion that a book is “thought-provoking” is often thrown out there for works of non-fiction, and of those that are described as such that I have read most very seldom are. This book is different, Dr. Black has written not so much a history as a treatise challenging historians, particularly military historians, to reexamine the history of conflict in the examined period with the idea of total war uppermost in their minds. It seems a counter-intuitive thing to do at first, but he provides plenty of examples of why the wars under consideration were not total or were only partially total at best. This includes World War II, which was total in some aspects but limited in others.

The biggest distinction the Dr. Black makes in discussing totality in warfare is the difference between war aims/victory conditions and the methods used to wage war. He posits that while war aims are sometimes total, such as seeking the destruction of the enemy or the dissolution of their state, the methods of war making have often been far from total. Even the most brutal of wars between nation states are often not total as the combatants do not actually seek the physical destruction of their enemies. He actually points out that it is most often revolutionary or sectarian conflicts where the physical destruction of opponents is a goal and uses the examples of Rwanda in 1994, 1990′s Bosnia, the German suppression of the Herero in the early 1900s, and many of the wars of decolonization in Africa and East Asia as examples, many of which fall outside of the period examined.

This is a global history of the period to an extent, but there is an emphasis on wars that occurred within Europe simply because so much more is known about them. He examines the conditions in these wars and discusses the ways in which they were and were not total. On of his most interesting discussions in the book is a wide-ranging discussion of fighting quality in his chapter on WWII and the way in which that aspect of the war has been under served in the literature.

He closes the book with a discussion of totality in the Cold War period and looking forward and the way in which the entire concept of total war needs to be reexamined and that military history needs to get away from just examining the wars of Europe but also look at the rest of the world. It is a telling observation that in English language history’s the rest of the world is virtually ignored unless a western nation was engaged in the conflict with Israel being the exception.

In closing, Dr. Black has produced a book that should inspire even the most casual of students of military history to reevaluate the way in which they think of total war. This book should be on the shelf of every student of military history but particularly that of those talking heads that go on news shows and fatuously offer their supposed wisdom about warfare for the masses. An excellent and yes, thought provoking book, I highly recommend it.

Historical Resources on the Web

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Posted on September 26, 2011 by Patrick Shrier

Updated 18 February 2012

Below the fold is a list of historical sources on the internet, this includes both primary and secondary source collections. I am constantly updating this list when I run across useful sites. Please point me at sites I miss in the comments section.

I am trying to keep this blog mostly academic or at least reasonably scholarly while at the same time making most of my source material easily available. Therefore I thought it would be a good idea to put up a note about sources I use on the site. For the most part I will try to use online sources in my essays and blog posts for one main reason. There is tons of great information on the internet if you know where to look and how to search. I hope that by posting online sources it will point people to some of the many resources available online. Occasionally I will use books from my personal library to cite some items that I just cannot find an online source for.

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Book Review: The German Way of War by Robert M. Citino

Posted on May 16, 2011 by Patrick Shrier

This book is an interesting read to say the least, Dr. Citino makes the case that there is a specifically German “way of war”. That way, is what he calls operational maneuver. He traces the development of this “way of war” from the 17th century battles of the Frederick William I, the “Great Elector” of electoral Brandenburg and scion of the Hohenzollern Dynasty through to the end of World War II and the final defeat of Nazi Germany. I am not myself so convinced that the discussion should end there based on my experience talking to current German soldiers about war and battle during partnership exercises while I have been stationed in Germany. The current state of operational thought in the Bundeswehr is a topic for another post though. (Bing! Idea Grenade)
Dr. Citino also rightly points out in numerous places that the study of military history should not be a form of “armchair generalship”. He says that instead “The primary question for historians should not be what someone ought to have done, but why they did what they did.”, (original italics pg. 269)
While I generally agree with Dr. Citino’s assertion about Prussian/German war making methods, I am not so certain that it is possible to trace such a method back to the wars of the Great Elector as he has done except in a very vague way. I simply do not think it is possible to talk about the operational level of warfare when one is speaking of armies small enough for one man to personally command. In my opinion, the first time you can really start talking about an operational level of warfare, is the Napoleonic wars. That was the first time that a commander had no choice but to rely on subordinate commanders to maneuver and fight significant portions of his army without him being able to take personal control. This was a function of both the size and geographic distribution of the armies involved. There was no operational level involved when dealing with armies of 20-30,000 men that marched and fought as essentially a single unit, even when one wing was detached at the point of contact. Armies of 50,000 and more that marched as separate units and could fight independently or together are a different matter entirely.
I do think that Dr. Citino has hit on an overlooked part of the German “way of war” in his recognition of a German tradition of a preference for offensive operations and a culture of élan that was nurtured within the culture of German military leadership. It is this preference for offensive over defensive warfare that sets German military tradition apart from other armies. No other army has so consistently sought to achieve a rapid decision in war as the Germans. Dr. Citino is also right in citing first Brandenburg’s and later Prussia’s and Germany’s strategic situation for fostering the desire for rapid victory. The wonder as I see it is that Germany was so successful in achieving this over the years. That is one of the things that makes the study of Prussian military history so interesting, they have won many wars they should have lost because of their method of making war.
The German Way of War is one of those rare military history books that are accessible to the layman while being written for the academic community. It is unfortunate that so many histories are written in such a style that the average person cringes and puts the book down after only a few pages if they even hazard to pick the book up in the first place. This is not one of them. It is extremely well written with only a few editing mistakes that I saw and the most notable was the substitution of the name of the city of Königsberg in East Prussia instead of the Battle of Königgrätz in a list of major German 19th century victories on page 236 and some minor spelling errors and omissions of words. The books includes extensive notes and source citations, the bibliography alone runs to 27 pages and is a valuable guide to the available literature on German Military history all by itself. I highly recommend this book.

The German Way of War?

Posted on April 25, 2011 by Patrick Shrier

Is there such a thing? That question hit me this morning as I was reading a book review in an old copy of the Journal of Military History. The book in question was Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (Modern War Studies), by Robert M. Citino and it was reviewed in the January 2009 issue of the Journal. The reviewer made mention that one of the prevalent theories about the German army is that in World War II they fought a completely different war than the one they were designed for and that goes far to explaining the ultimate German defeat.

The argument is that the German army was designed to fight short, sharp, decisive campaigns and not the types of slugging matches that the World Wars became. On the face of it that argument seems both instinctual and correct. This is especially so when you consider the German victories in the Wars of German Unification when they managed to defeat armies superior to them or equal with astonishing rapidity. The surface is only about as far as that analysis can really go in my opinion.

It is an oversimplification at best to claim that the Germans lost because they fought the wrong war. I definitely fall into the camp that blames the German military, especially its leadership, with a failure of courage. They knew they would be fighting the wrong war and could have but did not stop Hitler from taking control. What makes it all worse in my opinion is that after the war they got busy trying to make excuses for letting the Hitler and the Nazis do what they did. Instead, the officers retreated into a fantasy world of claiming that they had to keep their oaths of loyalty or do their duty. Even a cursory look would show that they signally failed to do their duty.

In the final analysis, it boils down to whether the military is duty bound to serve the nation or the regime. I know what I would argue but rather than go into that here, I don’t want to digress too far from my main point. Especially since the discussion of duty would rapidly devolve into a metaphysical navel-gazing contest.

Is there a German Way of War? If you look at the Prussian army, and the German army was really just an extension of Prussian methods and doctrine, then perhaps a Way of War can be perceived. The first part of any discussion of a German Way of War is to examine the history of the Hohenzollern state to even begin to understand the way the Prussians thought. then you must look at the German/Prussian strategic situation in relation to that of other nations. Next you have to examine the Prussian/German state itself to have an understanding of the logistical and manpower constraints within which the state and military operated. Next is looking at the military methods and strategy the Prussians/Germans thought most appropriate for both defending and expanding their frontiers.

All those things need to be looked at if a good appreciation of what, if anything is the German Way of War. This will be a multi-post series that I will try to complete over the next few weeks, the demands of real-life allowing.

Book Review: The Storm of Steel by Ernst Junger

Posted on March 26, 2011 by Patrick Shrier

Just about everyone has heard of Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front, it is the work of fiction about World War I. It has been made into a movie several times and is supposed to represent the inhumanity of the war and the hopelessness felt by its participants in the trenches.

Ernst Jünger in World War I

Ernst Jüngers, The Storm of Steel by contrast, is a different sort of World War I book entirely. Where Remarque wrote an anti-war novel based on his experiences in the war, Jünger not only did not write an anti-war account of the war he positively relished his time in the trenches. Jünger was wounded six times during the war. He spent the entire war on the Western Front, usually in the British sector. He was also involved in almost every major battle that occurred in the West to include the Archangel Offensives by the Germans and subsequent German retreats in 1918.

He writes a straightforward account of what he did and where he was without very much in the way of soul-searching. The biggest thing that comes across in his account of the war is how exhilarating he felt combat to be. One of the biggest things he complains bout, if you can call it complaining, was the way that rations got worse as the war went on. He is never apologetic for the German cause nor does he express doubts that his cause was right.

He provides some vivid descriptions of the experience of combat. One of the best is his description of what it was like to undergo an artillery barrage. It is so good that it is worth quoting in full as it aptly describes receiving indirect fire and it provides a taste of his writing style. The account is from 1916 during the British Somme Offensive and his unit was being bombarded:

I believe I have found a comparison that exactly conveys what I, in common with all the rest who went through the war, experienced in situations such as this. It is as if one were tight to a post and threatened by a fellow swinging a sledge-hammer. Now the hammer is swung back for the blow, now it whirls forward, till just missing your skill, it sends splinters flying from the post once more. That is exactly what it feels like to be exposed to heavy shelling without cover.

The Storm of Steel should be on the reading list of anybody interested in World War I who wants an uncensored account of what life was like for a German soldier on the Western Front. I heartily recommend this book.