De Re Militari is back up

Aside

Just a quick info post.

Anybody who has tried to follow the link to DeReMilitari on the sidebar of the blog in the past few weeks has discovered that Google says it is a malware hosting site.  They were hacked at the beginning of the month but are now back up.  They are having to completely rebuild their site because apparently the malware got them good.  So far they have their review section up because it was not affected by the hack.  The rest of their site should come back up over the next few weeks or months.

Glad to see them back they are an invaluable starting point for Medieval research.

The Combat of the Thirty

Here is an interesting episode that occurred in March, 1351 during the Hundred Years War.  It occurred during the Hundred Years War but was only really a peripheral part of it.  The combat occurred between the French garrison of Josselin Castle and the English garrison of Ploërmel Castle Brittany, part of modern day France. It was instigated because the English were not abiding by the terms a truce that had been made locally.

The challenge to combat was issued by the French commander Jean de Beaumanoir to Robert Bramborough. On 26 or 27 March, 1351 the challengers met each other midway between the two castles with 29 retainers giving each a force of thirty men to decide the issue.  Before the battle commenced the two parties met and exchanged greetings and pleasantries before backing away from each other to make final preparations.

At a prearranged signal the two parties rushed to attack each other and the battle commenced.  Any weapons was allowed as well as being mounted and using lances.  The battle lasted for approximately nine hours before the English were beaten.  Nine Englishmen and four Frenchmen were killed in the fighting and all of the English were taken prisoner and later release after the payment of a ransom.  Additionally, almost every participant was wounded in some way.

The episode had no perceptible effect on the course of the War but became famous as an example of the purest form of Chivalry.  It was celebrated in a poem by Froissart that became famous and the surviving combatants became famous and were honored for the rest of their lives.  Their is a famous anecdote about Froissart meeting a participant at a party hosted by Charles V in which the veteran was seated at the head table and honored for his participation in the Combat.

Below are some links to both the poem by Froissart and a text account as well:

This is video of a reenactment of the Combat of the Thirty at one of the modern Rennfests.

Below is a list of the comabatants in the Combat of the Thirty.

The Combatants
French
Knights

  • Sir Jean de Beaumanoir, Constable of Brittany, Governor of Josselin
  • Sir Olivier Arrel
  • Sir Caron de Bosdegas
  • Sir Geoffroy du Bois
  • Sir Yves Charruel
  • Sir Guy de Rochefort
  • Sir Jean Rouxelot
  • Sir Robin Raguenel
  • Sir Huon de Saint-Hugeon
  • Sir Jean de Tinténiac

Squires

  • Geoffroy de Beaucorps
  • Hughes Capus-le-Sage
  • Olivier de Fontenay
  • Louis de Goyon
  • Alain de Keranrais
  • Guillaume de la Lande
  • Guillaume de la Marche
  • Geoffroy de Mellon †
  • Guillaume de Montauban
  • Olivier de Monteville
  • Maurice du Parc
  • Tristan de Pestivien
  • Guyon de Pontblanc
  • Geoffroy Poulard †
  • Simonet Pachard
  • Geoffroy de la Roche
  • Jean de Serent
  • Alain de Tinténiac
  • Maurice de Tréziguify
  • Geslin de Trésiguidy

English
Knights

  • Sir Robert Bramborough Captain of Ploërmel †
  • Sir Robert Knolles
  • Sir Thomas Billefort
  • Sir Thomas Walton
  • Sir Hugh Calveley
  • Sir Hervé Laxaualan
  • Sir Richard Lalande

Squires & Men-at-Arms

  • John Plesington
  • Richard Gaillard
  • Hughes Gaillard
  • Huceton Clemenbean
  • Hennequin de Guenchamp
  • Renequin Hérouart
  • Hennequin Le Mareschal
  • Raoulet d’Aspremont
  • Gaultier l’Alemant
  • Bobinet Melipart
  • Jean Troussel
  • Robin Adès
  • Perrot Gannelon
  • Guillemin-le-Gaillard
  • Jennequin Taillard
  • Rango-le-Couart
  • Raoul Prévot
  • Dardaine †
  • Repefort
  • Croquart the German
  • Isannay
  • Dagworth (nephew of Thomas Dagworth)
  • Helichon
  • Helecoq

† indicates that the combatant was killed. Nine Englishmen were killed in total and the remainder captured. At least three Frenchmen were killed and a number of them were captured during the fighting, but were released after the final French victory.

Medieval Armor was heavy; Is this a Surprise?

I ran across this article on discovery news today: Heavy Armor Led to French Knights’ Loss.The article immediately irritated me. Perhaps it was the way the article was written or perhaps it was the content of the interviews with the guys who did the study. The gist of the story is that some English researchers had some medieval reenactor volunteers don period medieval armor and do various exercises on a treadmill while their various bodily functions were measured such as breathing, heart rate, etc. The article makes out as if it is a surprise that one, medieval suits of plate mail were heavy and two, that knights tire rapidly while walking in them. Does not common sense say that both things are true? Anyone who has ever had to carry a heavy backpack knows that carrying something heavy tires you out faster. That medieval plat armor was heavy is not a new discovery either. Keegan points this out in The Face of Battle and it is widely remarked in many books on medieval warfare.

This is the standout quote from the article for me:

“Together with numbers and condition of soldiers, equipment availability, battle strategy, and terrain, the high energetic cost of movement in armor could have contributed to the outcome of medieval battles,” the researchers concluded.”

Those are the concluding lines from the article. All I could say to that was wow.

I suppose it is good to have experimental confirmation of inductive reasoning but I have to wonder if this knowledge or proof actually changes the conclusions of the reasons for victory and defeat in medieval battles. I cannot think of any off the top of my head where fatigue would have played a part that it is not already accounted for in the standard analysis of the battle including at the Battle of Agincourt. I have to wonder about what is the usefulness of this “new” knowledge then?

Book Review: The Face of Battle by John Keegan

I have to caveat this review somewhat.  I wrote this book review for an undergrad military history course I took almost six-years ago.  I still think that the The Face of Battle is an excellent book.  I have modified my opinion of Keegan as a historian somewhat though.  I think he is somewhat overrated and he tends to simplistic British-centric judgements in his analysis of military history.  He is a good historian, but sometimes his interpretations of events are not all they could be.

“The Face of Battle” by John Keegan has become a classic in the thirty years since it was published.  The book is an attempt to examine three historical battles from the point if view of the participants: Agincourt-1415, Waterloo-1815, and The Somme-1916.  All the battles are chosen as representing the archetype of the battles of the period as well as being well documented.

He begins the book by defining the parameters of what he is trying to accomplish.  He defines a battle as not just fighting or small scale skirmishing but a fight that “must obey the dramatic unities of time, place, and action.”  The most defining point being the action “which is directed towards securing a decision by and through those means, on the battlefield and within a fairly strict time limit”- thus at one strike he limits his subject to preclude most of the combat fought throughout history, the set-piece battle being fairly rare.

Keegan takes issue with the conventional study of military history as being too dogmatic and not more liberal in mode of thought.  That is a criticism that holds true today in much contemporary military history.  Similarly, Keegan is at pains to show that the methods in which military history is written have sound and compelling arguments given the target audience of those histories.  The largest point that Keegan makes is that the conventional battle piece history is insufficient to accurately describe the behavior of large masses of men in what is arguably one of the most stressful situations a person could ever find himself in.  He decries the mass description of behavior that while it may be typical of most participants is not typical of all.  He examines the types of history written and concludes that while there is much collective history there has not been enough attention paid to the individual and their experiences in war.

He analyses the individual’s experience of battle by breaking the battle down into its component parts.  He describes the campaign and battle itself then further subdivides it by describing the type of combat based on soldier and weapon archetypes.  He finally describes the aftermath of battle and how the participants coped with it.

The first battle described in the book is the Battle of Agincourt, which took place in northern France on October 25, 1415 as part of the Hundred Years War between England and France.  The scene is set by a short description of the campaign leading up to the battle and a concise narrative of the battle itself.  He begins his battle analysis by detailing some of the deficiencies in the available sources and what assumptions he has made to make up for these deficiencies in information.

The battle is broken down according to type of combat for analysis.  The combats he discusses are archer versus infantry and cavalry, cavalry versus infantry, and infantry versus infantry.  Keegan attempts to recreate the conditions under which each combat occurred and give the modern reader some idea of what it must have been like to be in the battle.

The analysis is full of descriptive phrases that paint a picture of what the experience of medieval battle was like.  Another element of his battle description that sets his writing apart from other battle narratives is Professor Keegan’s use and explanation of the technical terms describing how he reaches his conclusions on the way the battle was fought.

Keegan makes a specific point of logically scrutinizing the king’s order to execute the prisoners when he feared a French resumption of the attack.  He then describes how the battle ended with Henry’s summoning of the French and English heralds to fix a name for the battle.  Then he describes how the wounded were cared for and what the prognosis for the different type of wounds was.  He finalizes his account of the battle by discussing the will to combat of the soldiers of the Middle Ages.

Keegan jumps four hundred years of history to his next battle description, that of Waterloo between the Allied armies and the French under Napoleon on June 18, 1815.  Waterloo was the culminating battle of over twenty years of continental warfare dating to the French revolution in 1789, it was to define an age and usher in era of European peace that would last for fifty years.

His treatment of the Battle of Waterloo is roughly the same as his treatment of Agincourt though here he distinguishes between more weapon types than were present at Agincourt.  The types of combat Keegan relates at Waterloo are single combat, cavalry versus cavalry, cavalry versus infantry, cavalry versus artillery, artillery versus infantry, and infantry versus infantry.  While some engagements are the same, the type and nature of combat was completely altered due to the weapons used.

Keegan makes much of the fact that wounds suffered at waterloo were likely to be much graver than wounds received at Agincourt.  He also points out that though there was medical care available it was almost exactly the opposite of what would be prescribed in modern times.

Another large difference is in the number of soldiers engaged there were close to 100,000 troops on both sides at Waterloo compared to a maximum of 30,000 total engaged at Agincourt.  This increased the size of the battlefield though the battle was still substantially over after the first day.

The last battle the Keegan examines is the First Battle of the Somme from June to November 1916 and only June 1, 1916 the first day of the battle is examined in detail.  This battle is also described using the same basic format as Agincourt and Waterloo.  There are two types of combat discussed, infantry versus machine-gunners, and infantry versus infantry; though a case could be made that infantry versus artillery should be included as a distinct type and not just discussed in the passages leading to the battle description.

Throughout his description and analysis of the battle, he repeatedly points out the horrifying nature of trench warfare.  He describes the plight of the wounded caught in no-mans land and contrasts that with the experience of the wounded that made it to a casualty clearing station.

The final section of the book is concerned with the future of battle in warfare and Keegan’s assertion that the modern battlefield has become too lethal a place for man to exist upon it.  This is the only part of the book that is open to criticism.  Here Keegan has fallen into the historian’s trap of trying to predict the future.  Nobody knows what the future may bring except the certainty that it will be different.  It has been predicted for sixty years that nuclear weapons would make war obsolete and humanity has continued to prove that it will still fight.  It can be said with certainty that war will change and may even change in a fundamental way but it is an excess of hubris to think that man will not find a way to fight as long as he thinks that doing so may gain some advantage.

In summation “The Face of Battle” is an excellent piece of research in the nature and experience of the common man at war.  I would highly recommend it to anyone who would like to get an appreciation for what combat is like.  I disagree that there is a qualitative difference between set piece battle and small-scale conflict the emotions and experience of the common soldier are essentially the same during combat itself.  The difference lies in the period between combat actions where I would argue that it is more stressful to be in small-scale conflict when combat can happen at anytime as compared to set piece battles where combat can be somewhat anticipated.

The Preparedness of the First Crusade

The First Crusade was arguably the most successful of the various numbered crusades; however, they were not particularly well equipped for a campaign in Asia Minor.  It is no surprise that they were not, as the climate in Anatolia is completely different from Europe.  What is amazing is the way in which the crusaders persevered in spite of the hardships they had to endure throughout the march across Asia Minor.The Capture of Jerusalem in 1099

The main crusader army seems to have had an appreciation for the difficulties involved in a march across Anatolia; no doubt; the counsel of the Byzantine emperor, Alexius I Comnenus (1081–1118) was helpful in their choice of march route.  Prior to leaving the region of Nicaea to continue the crusade, the leaders held a council at Pelekanum where the Frankish leaders and the Alexius discussed further plans for the crusade.[1] It was decided that the Crusader army would move as a series rather than together so that there would be more flexibility in deployment, and to simplify logistics.

This movement order was proven to be a wise decision just four short das after the continuation of the march when the Turkish Sultan Kilij Arslan (1092-1107) attacked the vanguard at Dorylaeum on 29 June.  The vanguard remained on the defensive until 30 June when the following echelon arrived and set the Turks to flight.[2]

The following months were to prove that the initial assumptions by the crusaders as to the difficulty of their movement were false.  The crusading army had planned to subsist by foraging while crossing Asia Minor, but this plan was soon shown to be flawed.  After the Battle of Dorylaeum, Kilij Arslan adopted a scorched earth policy in Asia Minor.  The Turks laid waste to the countryside along the crusaders line of march.[3] The crusaders suffered horribly during the next four months, many people died form starvation and lack of water, though this was somewhat ameliorated when the army reached Armenian Christian territory in August.

During the move many of the knights’ horses died, forcing some of the knights to become foot soldiers.  It was not only mounts that died but also pack animal and the crusaders were forced to use different animals as beasts of burden.  The chroniclers make much of the crusaders use of goats, sheep, and even dogs as pack animals and of knights using oxen as mounts.[4]

Once the crusaders arrived at Antioch, there problems were compounded by the fact that they were stationary.  The siege of Antioch while ultimately successful was another example of the poor planning of the crusade.  The crusaders succeeded almost in spite of themselves.

The training and equipment of the crusader army was up to the task of defeating the Turks and Egyptians.  The main reason for this is that the Muslims were not only unfamiliar with the methods of warfare as practiced by the Franks, but the western knights and soldiers wore heavier armor than they did.  The Turks and to a lesser extent other Muslims fought as mounted horse archers and were not equipped for the type of shock combat employed by the crusaders.  The crusaders were trained and equipped for the shock of combat between heavy horsemen and at first could not adequately respond to the harrying tactics of the Turks.

The Turks, whose army was composed almost exclusively of mounted archers, typically attacked in waves.  The first wave would approach and unleash a hail of arrows and retreat while succeeding waves waited behind to come up and do the same.[5] The Franks, on the other hand, relied upon heavy, who would deliver a devastating charge at opportune moments.[6]

Christian knights proved themselves fearless in battle, and when they maintained discipline, they nearly always prevailed.  The danger for the crusaders lay in a breakdown of discipline because of the quarrels among the leadership.  This was to prove almost disastrous at the siege of Antioch.  Time and again, the crusade seemed doomed to failure but the crusaders managed to find a compromise every time.

While the crusaders fooled themselves into thinking they were prepared for crossing Anatolia, they were not.  The crusaders suffered horrifically while enroute to the holy land and it was only religious zeal and their singleness of purpose that kept them moving forward when times were hard.  The story of the First Crusade is one of un-preparedness and success despite the odds.

Bibliography

Asbridge, Thomas. The First Crusade: A New History, The Roots of Conflict Between Christianity and Islam. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  2004

Maalouf, Amin.  The Crusades through Arab Eyes. New York, NY: Schocken Books. 1984

Madden, Thomas F.  The New Concise History of the Crusades. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2005

Riley-Smith, Jonathan, ed. The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  1995

Endnotes


[1] Asbridge, Thomas. The First Crusade. p, 132

[2] Madden, Thomas F.  The New Concise History of the Crusades. p. 25

[3] Asbridge. pp. 137-138

[4] Madden. p. 25

[5] Maalouf, Amin.  The Crusades through Arab Eyes. p. 16

[6] Riley-Smith, Jonathan, ed. The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades. pp. 20-21