Tag Archives: strategy

Honey or Salt?

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There is an old adage that “you can catch more flies with honey than with salt.” The truth of that adage is being put to the test daily in Afghanistan and being to shown to be false under certain circumstances at least. ISAF is not winning currently, but they are not exactly losing either. At best from what I read, see, and hear ISAF is fighting a delaying action against the inevitable fall of the central government and rise of whatever Islamic extremist group bubbles up out of the morass of internal Afghan politics. I can almost guarantee it won´t be the Taliban, but probably someone very much like them.

A few weeks ago, a friend of mine was back from his current tour in Afghanistan for R&R, I got the opportunity to sit down and talk to him a little about what is going on in his unit´s AO and it was not heartening. That talk, combined with the generally dismal news coming out of that Godforsaken country has really started me wondering if we can achieve our goals there. I don´t think we need to pull out and wash our hands of Afghanistan just yet but the time is rapidly approaching when I may start advocating that.

It is obvious that COIN doctrine is a complete failure in the fractured society of Afghanistan. Mainly I think that is because above the level of the clan the average Afghan cannot really conceive of having loyalty to anything. That goes double for something as amorphous as a national state. The central government has not really done anything for them and furthermore, is almost nonexistent outside of the provincial capitals and bigger towns. The Taliban are everywhere though, what´s more, their justice is swift and uncompromising, and they can actually enforce their edicts.

ISAF Patch

The essential question right now for the US and the rest of ISAF is what is the way forward? Are they really only looking to 2014 and an exit strategy? What are the plans when/not if another pro-terrorist or tolerant regime comes to power? Lastly, if we are only looking to get out, are we achieving anything in terms of training and development right now that justifies staying for another two years? All are questions without good answers that I can see.

Getting back to the title of the post, is current COIN doctrine working in Afghanistan? From where I sit, the answer seems to be a resounding no. The number of incidents in which supposedly friendly Afghan troops turn their weapons on the ISAF troops they are working with is amazing as a simple Google search for ana-isaf shootings shows.  It also does not help that simple YouTube search for U.S. Army Soldiers Helmet Cam Firefights, turns up a legion of videos that the Taliban can use to examine our squad level TTPs or Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.  These videos are a major OPSEC failure at a minimum and the guys posting them are putting themselves and all their comrades in danger no matter how cool or exciting the videos may be.

It is apparent to me that what the US and by extension the rest of ISAF has tried to do is take what worked in Iraq and transplant it to Afghanistan and it has signally failed as a doctrine for the conditions in Afghanistan. Perhaps ISAF needs to fight more as the Taliban do, and by that, I do not mean fighting from the shadows. I mean perhaps ISAF should start going after the thing that Afghans value the most, the families of known insurgents. We do not need to necessarily kill them; it would probably be enough to sequester them. I am thinking something more along the lines of what the British did in the Boer War, the original concentration camps.

With proper planning, ISAF could eliminate a source of support for the insurgents while at the same time applying pressure to the insurgents to come to an accommodation with the central government. They could also get the NGOs involved in running such camps helping to ensure the the people are treated well and the rest of the world knows that.  Credible threats to apply a policy of collective guilt, a concept known in Islam, can also be used. It would probably take some executions of family members to make the insurgents realize ISAF was serious, but you can´t make an omelet without breaking eggs and aid to insurgents is virtually the same thing as detonating an IED. The family and other supporters of insurgents are just as responsible for violence as are the insurgents themselves. Some type of scorched earth policy would probably also be necessary.

What is even better is that such a plan has some chance of success because I does not treat the Afghans as if they are poor Westerners, which is the mistake Westerners often make when dealing with people of other cultures.  Of course, if such a plan were implemented the Bleeding Hearts like Amnesty International and other likeminded groups would scream bloody murder.  It would also be hard for Western governments to ignore these groups, there tentacles are so deep in the political left of the West.

In the end, I don’t think that Western Governments have the will to do what they have to do to achieve victory in Afghanistan and we are wasting our time and soldiers lives for an enterprise that is ultimately futile.  I would love to see us win or at least eliminate the potential for radical Islamism to come out of Afghanistan again.  I just don’t see that in the cards given the nature of Western politics and the established that elected leaders really plan no farther than the next election.

I sincerely hope that I am wrong though.  That is something that only time will tell.  I am pretty goo at describing the past but my powers of predicting the future are often not that great.  May this prediction be one of those.  Otherwise, I fear that the West will be back in that corner of the world in the not too distant future essentially trying to do the same thing we are doing now.

Ralph Peters had an excellent piece on RCP a few weeks ago that both elegantly and not so elegantly expresses the frustration that people with military backgrounds and no political ax to grind have with the conduct of the war in Afghanistan. His not so elegant yet oh so apt summation is “In war, soldiers die. But they shouldn’t die for bullshit.” The full piece is here: Soldiers Murder Afghans, Generals Murder Soldiers

It is not that I don’t think we should fight.  I just think that if we are going to fight this war then lets fight to win and not fight to find a “honorable exit” similar to what we supposedly achieved in Vietnam in 1973.

Tactical Aspects of Battle: A Discussion

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There is a very interesting pair of essays in the Baen free non-fiction compendium for 2011. The essence of these two pieces is the geo-strategic position of the United States in the early 21st Century and what the American prospects for maintaining global dominance are. This piece is not necessarily about geopolitics but it did get me thinking about another idea I have been tossing around in my head for the past few years, and that is tactics. Specifically tactics and the way their use affects the course of battles both classical and contemporary.

Image from the Broadside Blog at http://www.militarytimes.com/blogs/broadside/2011/11/01/halloween-and-military-tactics/

Too often, tactical considerations are given short shrift in accounts of battle. For example, it is common to read historians that claim the German Army was tactically superior to most of their opponents throughout WWII, but it is never actually pointed out in what ways they were superior except in very general terms. Generally, tactics are discussed in any meaningful way only when the historian needs to make a point. I think this is a mistake. I wish I could remember who pointed out that battles are actually only the sum total effects of all the individual combats that they comprise. The more I ponder this, the more I realize that it is true. The individual and small unit leaders are more indispensable to success in battle than is generally acknowledged.

Consider that even at the advent of the gunpowder age and throughout the era of muzzle-loading weapons, tactical considerations came into play in battle. It was not just lines of muzzle-loader armed men lining up across from each other and banging away at each other to see which side cold withstand the punishment longer. There was tactical movement on the battlefield as one side tried to take the other in the flank or maneuvered their artillery to concentrate on one segment of the enemy’s line to create a breach.

We should also remember that armies were not homogenous blocs of automatons. There was a reason for the harsh discipline employed in the armies of the day. Desertion before or during battle could and sometimes did play a decisive tactical role. It is hard to maintain your line when it melts away because men are leaving. There was a reason that traditionally the job of the NCO was to force men to stay in line. There is an old military saying that “men should fear their leaders more than the enemy.” That saying grew out of practice.

As we advance into more modern times tactics became even more important as the battlefield began to empty. Starting around the time of the Napoleonic wars skirmishing became more important. In fact, skirmishing is the root for today’s tactics of fire and maneuver employed by ll successful armies today. As skirmishing became more prevalent the importance of small unit tactics and actions became more pronounced. A squad, platoon, company, or battalion maneuvering properly and opening its attack or showing itself in the defense at the right moment could and still can have a decisive effect on a battle. As the art of warfare has progressed the tactical employment of units has assumed ever greater importance as the battlefield has emptied out and battles more and more are comprised of small groups fighting to achieve and integrated objective.

The importance of tactical considerations has concurrently caused an increase in the importance of small unit leaders from squad leaders to battalion commanders. It is they who are the pont f the spear and make the immediate command decisions that affect the outcome of battle in line with what the US Army calls the “Commander’s Intent,” which is articulated in FM 101-5 on page 5-9. Essentially the commanders intent is nothing more than a definition of what mission success consists of. It can be anything, literally anything, such as holding a terrain feature, securing a town or building within a town, to completing a logistics mission successfully.

The Germans developed the method currently used by successful armies that really integrated tactics into operational and strategic planning and made it possible for many small units to work in concert without communication. The method was Auftragstaktik or mission-oriented orders in English. A discussion of Auftragstaktik is a whole other post though.

The point of this post is that it is my belief that tactical considerations in battle, specifically the contributions of tactical doctrine to battlefield success are at best poorly understood by most historians who prefer to see armies as one mass and the actions of generals and senior staffs to be more decisive. I acknowledge that generals and senior staffs have much more influence over the general course of a war than the individual soldier, squad, or company. However, when it comes down to actual fighting, poor doctrine or poorly rained troops can negate the best positioning and staff work in the world.

What do you think?

Book Review: Makers of Ancient Strategy – Edited by Victor David Hanson

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This book was conceived as being a sort of prequel to the modern classic, Makers of Modern Strategy, edited by Peter Paret and first published in the 70′s and updated in the 90′s. As Dr Hanson states in his foreword the scholars who wrote the various essays presented in the book did so with an eye to drawing lessons from antiquity that are relevant to the challenges faced by modern states and statesmen. They have succeeded admirably. It is not as hard to do as you might think despite the fact that modern war is fought with the benefit of tanks, night vision, aircraft, and satellite communications. Modern commanders Face many of the same challenges as did Xenophon, Pericles, Alexander, Caesar, or Constantine I. This is so because while technology as changed, basic human character has not.

The book itself is divided into ten chapters covering topics as diverse as urban warfare in ancient Greece to slave rebellion in the ancient world. The two chapters i found most interesting were the chapters on counterinsurgency and Ancient Rome and Roman frontier defense. The chapter on counterinsurgency illuminates the differences between the modern method of co-opting conquered peoples and the way the ancients did it and how close the two methods actually are. Th discussion of frontier defense is especially interesting by highlighting the way Rome managed to defend her huge frontiers for so long with such a small army. I know we are accustomed to think of the Roman army as large, but if you look at the size of the Roman army compared to the size of the Empire it was actually quite small.

Dr Hanson and the other eminent scholars that contributed to this work have produced a volume that should be on the bookshelf of anyone that aspires to leadership in a time of war whether they be military or civilian. They have proven the old adage that The more things change, the more they stay the same.

I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the way the ancients responded to military/strategic problems and how their solutions can provide lessons relevant to modern conflict.

Makers of Modern Strategy

Battle Analysis-Sedan, 1870

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The Battle of Sedan, fought on 1 September 1870 displayed the superiority the Prussian Army had attained over the French in the nearly sixty years since their devastating defeat at Jena in the Napoleonic wars. The battle was notable for several developments in warfare, which were showcased by the Prussian and French army’s different abilities to effectively utilize the new technologies and methods existing. The most dominant military technologies of the time were railroads, repeating rifles, and modern cannon.

Map of Battle of Sedan - Image Courtesy: http://www.marxists.org/glossary/events/f/pics/sedan.gif

While the French had at their disposal the Chassepot rifle which was superior to the Prussian needle-gun, their artillery was inferior in both quantity and quality to the Krupp guns deployed by the Prussians. The Prussians made superior use of the railroad in the deployment of their armies but that had little to do with their successful encirclement of the French army at Sedan, as the Prussians had largely been road bound and foot marching since crossing the French frontier at the beginning of August. The French failures of command and poor planning prevented them from retreating from Sedan thus forcing them to stand and fight the numerically superior Prussian army.

The Germans under Moltke proved to be energetic in their attacks and ruthless in the use of their superior artillery to bottle up the French and prevent their movements within the Sedan pocket. As the German armies approached Sedan, Moltke ordered his corps to probe the French and begin to march to encircle the French in the city. The Prussian armies quickly attacked to force crossings of the Meuse at Bazailles and Donchery. After the Prussians forced the crossing of the Meuse on 31 August, they moved rapidly to complete the encirclement of the French Army of Chalons and by that evening, the French were surrounded.

Like many battles of the war, the Prussians joined battle on the next morning not through any plan but through the actions of a lone commander acting on his initiative. At around 0430 on the first, the I Bavarian Corps mounted an attack to retake the bridge at Bazailes. As the Saxons moved up on the Bavarians flank in the early morning, they emplaced their artillery and began to attack also. The engagement rapidly spread from there to become a general attack on the surrounded French Army.

The Prussians made excellent use of their artillery to force the French to halt movement within the pocket. The effectiveness of Prussian artillery was a foretaste of what modern quick-firing artillery could accomplish. The Prussian army continued to make frontal infantry assaults even in the face of the tremendous casualties inflicted by the French using their superior rifles. The Prussians could have just as easily dominated the pocket with their artillery and thus saved themselves many of the 9,000 casualties they suffered during the battle.

Strategically the Battle of Sedan was a masterstroke for the Prussians as it removed the last trained French field army from the war. There were operational errors committed by Prussian generals who ignored or imperfectly followed orders but overall The Elder Moltke was shown to have a superior grasp of strategy than his French opponents. The major errors on the part of the Prussians were in their tactical use of infantry, artillery, and cavalry. They suffered needless casualties by not using their larger gun-line equipped with superior weapons to dominate the French before committing their infantry to battle. They were saved by their larger numbers and the yeoman’s effort put forth by the better-trained gunners of the Prussian army.

The battle could have been won more cheaply if Moltke had had better control of his subordinates and thus better control of the timing for beginning the battle, the impulsiveness of the Prussians cost them needless lives. The Prussian army did not use true combined arms tactics but with a larger and more disciplined army, their mistakes were not as detrimental to success as were the mistakes of the French.

The Decline and Fall of the United States?

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There has been much talk and discussion both in editorials and on various internet forums about the pending decline of the supposed US “empire” or the USA itself. I was thinking about this on the way back from dropping my wife off at work this morning and the more I think about it, the more I think it could only possibly happen if America lets it happen. The USA is not comparable to the UK prior to their fall from Great Power status post WWII. The disparity between the size of the two nations both physical and in population is too great for their to really be a valid comparison.

Image from http://http://blog.do-business-in-china.com

The USA has no choice in the modern world but to be a maritime power. This is especially true given the importance of trade to the future prosperity of the country. By virtue of the size and education of the US population it is inevitable that any military fielded by the US that is even half-way competently led will be a player on the global stage. America may have to share the world stage as one of the Great Powers with the rising giants of Asia such as China and India, but America will not lose it’s status as a Great power as quickly as did Britain and the European powers of the 19th century. Or, is there anyone willing to say that Britain, France, and Germany are all still Great Powers. I think their inability to sustain a small air campaign in Libya this past spring without significant American logistical support shows how far these nations have fallen. The problem with the countries of Europe is that they still think they matter on the world stage and while they may have some soft power they have none of the hard power they were able to use 100+ years ago.

China is an up and coming power, they are already an economic power although the amount of US debt they hold is a two edged sword that can cut both ways if they are not careful.  They are rapidly engaged in upgrading their military and especially in trying to build a blue-water navy that at a minimum will be able to challenge America for control of the Chinese littoral.  That they want to project power beyond the littoral is evident by their purchase and upgrading of an aircraft carrier.  Aircraft carriers are only used to project power, they are offensive platforms not defensive.  Submarines, destroyers and frigates are primarily defensive platforms.

The Chinese army has also been in a rush of modernization in recent years with a reduction in the number of soldiers in uniform but a concomitant increase in the quality of the troops that are left.  There is also the simple fact that with a population of over a billion, of which the majority are males, they have a huge reserve of unused manpower they can draw on in any future conflict that stayed conventional but involved large land armies.

India must be reckoned on as well.  The saving grace there is that India is a friendly power to the US and has increasingly adopted western ideals of government and freedom as it rapidly modernizes both its society and economy.

The US  looks set to maintain its ability to project hard power for the foreseeable future at least. As long as America can put a carrier battle group off someone’s coast, they are a power to be reckoned with. America may be in decline, but despite the current economic difficulties, a fall is quite a ways off.