20th Century

Military Uniforms

by

As I was getting ready for work this morning I started thinking about military uniforms and what their purpose is. I have heard all the typical reasons such as discipline, Esprit de Corps, identification, distinctiveness, economy, and of course, uniformity. The more I thought about it the more it hit me that the main reason for a uniform and also the most practical one to my mind is that of battlefield identification or simply being able to tell friend from foe. I think the discipline and Esprit parts of having a uniform are natural outgrowths but are not essential as elements. Uniforms have been around for literally thousands of years … More after the Jump…

The American Way of War – My Opinion

by

The American Way of War was introduced as a concept by Russell Weigley in his book of the same name during the early 1970’s.   Essentially the theory runs that America attempts to totally dominate her enemies in war thus ending the war.   The American method of achieving this during and since World War II has been through the judicious application of firepower; that is, overwhelming force directed against an enemy. American doctrine as it developed during and after World War II stresses the use of maximum force at the point of decision.   This is not much different from other nations doctrine, what makes it different is the … More after the Jump…

Dazzle Camo

by

A Mrs. Nora Holloway from the Military Gear Blog (Opennes Note:  The blog links to an an online store so it could be subtle spam)sent me an email a few days asking me to share an article she wrote concerning the history and possible future use of Dazzle Camoflage on military ships and vehicles.   She posits that perhaps there may be a resurgence in the use of dazzle camo based on recent research showing it is marginally effective in low-tech environments.   Dazzle Camo was used extensivley on ships in WWII but for some reason I highly doubt that it will make a comeback. Painting and repainting military vehicles … More after the Jump…

Battle Analysis-The Ludendorff Offensives of Spring 1918

by

In the spring of 1918 the German army attempted a series of war winning offensives on the Western Front that ultimately were to fail and their failure led directly to the German signing of an armistice in November of 1918.   The failure of the Ludendorff offensives as they were known was strategic and operational in nature.   The German army had devised a new tactical system and doctrine that broke the stalemate of the Western front.   What they could not do was follow through once the front had been broken. The Germans had developed the tactical system known as infiltration in response to the stalemate of trench warfare. … More after the Jump…

D-day: The 67th Anniversary

by

None of us in America should forget D-day, today 67th anniversary of the opening of the Second Front against Hitler in WWII.  The national archives has an excellent page with a election of documents and photographs related to that day.  Her are some photos that will hopefully provoke some refection on the sacrifices of our grandfathers and what has been characterized as “The Greatest Generation.”  And a link to the text of an excellent speech by Ronald Reagan on the 40th Anniversary: The Boys of Pointe du Hoc Let us never forget our men and women in uniform.  

The Fronts of World War I in 1915 & 1916

by

After Turkey’s entry into the war towards the end of 1914, the Dardanelles was closed to allied shipping and thus the only warm water route to Russian ports was closed.   The allied solution to this dilemma was to use the powerful British Navy in concert with a French battle group to force the Dardanelles and reopen the route to the Black Sea.   This operation gained added impetus with the massive Russian losses suffered in the previous year and because of the Turkish opening of a new front against Russia along their common frontier in the Caucasus. The first naval attempt to force the Dardanelles in February 1915 ended … More after the Jump…

The Opening Months of World War I in the East and Elsewhere

by

The opening months of World War I on the Eastern Front did not proceed at as the German General Staff thought they would.   When General Alfred von Schlieffen (1833-1912) was drawing up the German war plan that would subsequently bear his name, he made several assumptions about the Russian army that would prove to be false. The most glaring incorrect assumption was the Germans estimate of the time it would take the Russian army to take the offensive.   The German General Staff assumed it would the take the Russians at least forty days to complete mobilization and begin their offensive.   This was the amount of time they … More after the Jump…

Book Review: Fighting the Great War by Michael Neiberg

by

I originally saw Neiberg’s Fighting the Great War mentioned in a review essay covering recent works on WWI. The essay had good things to say about the work and then I decided to check and yes, the book had been reviewed by the Journal of Military History in the Jan 2007 issue, Vol. 71 no. 1 pg 242. I subscribe to the Journal so I pulled it it out and read the review. The review is generally favorable and recommends the book as a general history of the war. I did not have the same impression of the book as did the reviewer in JMH.I found the book to be … More after the Jump…

The Opening Months of World War I in the West

by

This will be a series of posts laying out the general history of the major Fronts in World War I. The First World War was unnecessary in that if the diplomats of Europe had truly wanted to stop the war there was ample opportunity in the five weeks between the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the start of the fighting.[1] The outbreak of war in 1939 can be directly traced to the terms of the Peace dictated at Versailles in 1919, and World War II was incomparably more destructive than World War I both in terms of lives lost and property destroyed. It was fashionable in the aftermath … More after the Jump…

Combatant Military Strategic Thought in 1914

by

All classical military theorists point out that military strategy and national policy are intermingled.   Clausewitz devotes a lengthy portion of his treatise to the ways in which military action should serve the needs of the state; indeed, his most famous quote concerns politics and war.   Most of the combatants in World War I seem to have forgotten that policy drives strategy. When the Elder Moltke was Chief of the German General Staff, German war-plans and policy neatly interlinked however, during Schleiffen’s tenure as Chief of the General Staff that link between policy and strategy was lost.   The Great Memorandum of 1905 ignored political reality in favor of … More after the Jump…

+ More