If you have 6 minutes to kill this is an excellent slideshow of some of the mos profound pictures from WWI. There is n context given just a running slideshow of images from soldiers standing around doing what they do most often in war,waiting, to a mass grave for horses, to battlefield scenes in No Man’s Land.
House of War: The Pentagon and the Disastrous Rise of American Power is one of those books that when you are done reading it you cannot quite decide if it was worth reading or not.
If you want to know what history looks like, particularly American history, from the perspective of someone who sees evil and nefarious dealings in just about every single action taken by the United States then this is the book for you. I never thought I would see the day when the Marshall Plan would be described as economic warfare but it is in this book and that is just one example. I found it difficult to suspend disbelief and finish this book but I managed to man up and do so. This is history of the Zinn School. That is, it is a history written by a person consumed with spite and self-loathing for the culture and nation that nurtured and created them.
There are several outrageous claims made throughout the book and they all essentially boil down to America was/is evil. Here are some examples:
- The Point Blank campaign that destroyed communications infrastructure in occupied Europe prior to the Allied invasion on D-Day was purposely designed to kill as many civilians as possible and any industrial or strategic effects were secondary results at best. Richard Overy does a very good job of destroying this particular fanstasy in his recently published book, The Bombers and the Bombed.
- The Marshall Plan was not designed to help rebuild Europe from the devastation of WWII, it was economic warfare against the Soviet Union and had nothing to do with helping anybody.
- The Soviet land blockade of Berlin that led to the Berlin Airlift was a response to economic attacks by the West. Specifically, he claims it was a response to the West’s apparently malicious introduction of the Deutsche Mark into the Western occupied zones.
- The North Korean’s were probably goaded into attacking the the South in 1950 by a speech by Dean Acheson. The subtext here is that the war would not have happened if it were not for the US.
He goes on and on ad nauseum about NSC-68 being evil and completely ignores the fact that the strategy of communist containment outlined in the document was ultimately the strategy that won the Cold War for the West. Of course, he thinks the West should not have won. If you take this book at face value you would come away believing that Communists the world over are/were a bunch of peaceful little boggles that were forced into being the brutish thugs who murdered their own people by the millions because of the evil machinations of the West. In this long story of the perfidy of the West the brutal Soviet crackdowns on satellite states are ignored and Soviet intervention elsewhere are always presented as being reasonable responses to Western aggression.
I would call this book a waste of paper but that is not strong enough. It is worthwhile in one respect though. If you can see beyond the banality and fake moralism it gives a pretty clear picture of the intense dislike of the modern American left for the United States. I found myself wondering, if the author finds America so evil why is he still here? The one thing that comes through clearly in the entire book is the author’s conviction that America and the wider West are the true Evil Empire and it is only if the West gives itself over to the modern left/progressive movement that we can hope to atone for the sin of our very existence. That all this comes from a de-frocked Catholic Priest should be no surprise.
I cannot recommend this book except as an excellent example of what infinitely biased history and twisted facts look like. Luckily I did not pay for it having borrowed it from my local library.
Breakout: Pioneers of the Future, Prison Guards of the Past, and the Epic Battle That Will Decide America’s Fate by former House Speaker Newt Gingrich would probably have been a more interesting book if it had introduced some new ideas. Sadly, it does not. The book is nothing more than a rehashing of the tired ideas that have been floating around in conservative circles for years.
One would think that in 209 pages of text at least one original idea would appear. The book is separated into 13 topical chapters with an introduction and a conclusion. There is an extensive notes section and a surprisingly good index.
The topics cover everything from Education, to Healthcare, to Government and Business and much in between. The essential argument of the book, and one I actually cannot disagree with is that the biggest problem in the US right now is government. Government regulation and intellectual luddites are stifling innovation and holding the country back from making the conceptual leaps and paradigm shift that it is capable of to extend American leadership into the 21st century and beyond.
Speaker Gingrich makes an eloquent argument that over-regulation and political interests are holding the country back. There is no reason for the current economic and societal malaise that we are not inflicting on ourselves. I found especially demining his description of the over-cautious FDA drug and device approval process and the ways in which oil exploration and extraction in the US is being deliberately slowed and even stopped. I share the Speakers concern that there is a large segment of people in America that actively want the country to fail and work to see that it does. I find it equally dismaying that such people even exist. What I don’t share is his optimism that there is a way out of the mess by working within the current system. I hope that he is right and I am wrong.
Regardless, this is a well written book that explains the many issues presented in a rational and non-extremist manner. Speaker Gingrich is a past master at making seemingly complex issues easy to understand, Breakout continues in that tradition and for that reason alone is worth reading. I recommend this book to anyone interested in contemporary politics and the ways in which said politics are stifling progress both societally and technologically.
From the opening months of the World War I, Flanders was the decisive sector for the British Army. It was in an around the medieval Belgian town of Ypres that the original BEF had decimated themselves fending off German attacks from October to December, 1914. Ypres and the salient surrounding it was where the British would see the hardest and most prolonged fighting of all the places where the British would fight in World War I.
The Battle of Messines Ridge fought from 7-14 June, 1914 was not really a separate battle at all but rather the opening phase of what would come to be known variously as the Third Battle of Ypres or Passchendaele.
The Messines Ridge is on the southern shoulder of what was then the Ypres salient. It is commanding terrain the possession of which allowed the German army to see almost all the way into the center of the city of Ypres itself and observe British movements inside the salient allowing the Germans to target British concentrations of troops very accurately.
The Ridge itself is not very high, about 90 feet, but that was more than high enough for military purposes given the flat nature of the terrain in Flanders near the coast. I never fully appreciated the advantage to be gained from possession of a 90 foot ridge-line until my first visit to the battlefield in 2004 while on R&R from my tour in Iraq. In Flanders a 90 foot difference in elevation makes all the difference in the world.
Possession of the Messines Ridge would allow the British to deny observation of a significant portion of their rear area to the German army and would also serve as an excellent stepping off point for follow on offensive operations both to expand the salient and effect the ever elusive breakout that all generals from any side fervently wished for.
The immediate commander and primary planner for the British forces in the lead-up to Messines Ridge was Gen. Herbert Plumer who had the unfortunate reputation with Haig of being a plodder. Plumer reputation among the troops however was different. He was on of the few British generals who the troops adored or even loved because of his well-known concern for their welfare and desire to avoid excessive casualties.
The plan Plumer came up with to take the ridge entailed the explosion of 25 mines that the Royal Army had laboriously emplaced under the ridge in the months leading up to the commencement of the offensive. The mines ranged in size from the 96,500 lb St. Eloi mine to the 30,000 lb Petit Bois mines. These were set to essentially demolish and demoralize the German front line trenches whereupon the British troops were expected to easily occupy them before the stunned Germans could react and throw them out.
A creeping barrage by 2/3 of the 2,200 artillery pieces available was to “shoot the attacking infantry in” once the mines exploded. The rest of the artillery was reserved for use in the counter battery role to suppress German artillery to a depth of 9,000 yards along the attack front.
A preliminary bombardment lasting almost two weeks was also planned for the preparing the battlefield and hindering the Germans from reinforcing the sector to be attacked. (NOTE: preliminary bombardments of this style were not meant so much to destroy defensive works so much as to demoralize the enemy, injure defenders, and keep the enemies head down allowing attacking infantry to assault when the time came)
The Messines battle was the opening act of what was ultimately planned to be a British rupture of the German defenses in Flanders. The overall plan failed.
At approximately 3:10 a.m. on the morning of June 7th, 1917 19 of the 25 emplaced mines exploded. The 4 Birdcage mines were not detonated because the Germans had already evacuated the area by Zero-Hour and two failed to explode. The mines were wildly successful and the British troops did indeed essentially waltz into the German positions and establish occupancy.
The Germans attempted to counterattack on day one but they were unable to keep the British from occupying and holding the entirety of the first three lines of German trenches except for a portion of their third line which they retook from II ANZAC Corps.
On the morning of 8 June the II ANZAC Corps retook the section of the German third line they had been ejected from. The rest of the British assault divisions set about consolidating the defenses in the newly won positions while the British artillery provided disrupting fire on German counterattacks while a portion of the artillery was displaced forward.
German artillery unleashed a massive bombardment on the captured trenches during which it is estimated that the British suffered up to 90% of their casualties during the battle.
Once large-scale German counterattacks stopped on 14 June the Messines sector settled down until the Passchendaele battle restarted active fighting in the beginning of July.
The Battle for Messines Ridge was one of the few arguably successful offensives of World War I prior to the offensives of the Last Hundred Days in 1918.
[FULL DISCLOSURE: I received my copy of this book free from the author. I was not paid for this review and the opinion expressed is purely my own]
The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War Over Europe 1940-1945 is one of those books that is going to end up a standard work for a long time to come. It is the single most comprehensive history of the Allied bombing of Germany and occupied Europe during WWII that I have seen since the strategic bombing survey published by the US government in the immediate post-war years.
I have a review copy of the book so the page counts may be a little different in the published version. The book itself is 561 pages with 78 pages of notes, a 26 pages bibliography, and an 18 page index. It is divided into six chapters. The first three chapters are a chronological account of the air war over Germany and the last three are thematic dealing with the logic of bombing and the campaigns in Italy and the occupied countries.
Every book about the war talks about the bombing campaign and most take for granted that it was effective at least partially in reducing Germany’s war-making ability. This book examines the war in detail and tries to establish the effectiveness, if any, of the Allied bombing offensive. The answer is mixed at best.
It has always struck me as odd that despite the expenditure of hundreds of tons of bombs and the devastation of the center and surrounding regions of most industrial towns in Germany, german war production continued to increase throughout the war. Indeed, the most productive war of the month in terms of number of tanks and aircraft constructed was march of 1945. Given that, how could it be said that the bombing campaign was successful as many historians and the leaders of the campaign claimed?
The point of bombing was not to kill civilians, but to reduce the war making capacity of Germany. What Dr. Overy makes clear is that while industrial capacity was negatively affected in the wake of many raids, what was lost was regained and then some so rapidly that production halts were temporary at best. he attributes this to two causes; one, bombing accuracy was abysmal, and two, the Germans were very good at repairing damage and getting production lines running again.
It was considered a good raid by the british if there bombs fell within 5 miles of the target and three Americans thought within 3 miles was good. Bombing accuracy was so bad because the bombers flew very high to avoid AA fire and in the case of the English, they flew at night. The lower the bombers flew, the more accurate they were but they also suffered horrendous losses at low altitude due to AA fire and German fighters.
Added to bombing inaccuracy, was the depth and responsiveness of the German Civil and Air Defense Systems. The Germans had a multitude of agencies tasked with dealing with raiding damage and the German people themselves pitched in to make things good. The striking thing is that the Germans could have been even more effective if they had streamlined their civil defense organizations and avoided having a plethora of agencies trying to do the same thing.
The story of the bombing of italy shows that where the germans were very good, the Italians were very bad and italian civilians suffered as a result. Of special interest is the discussion of the bombing of occupied countries and the response of the occupied people to the destruction and loss of life inherent in being bombed to get their freedom.
This is an outstanding book and I highly recommend it to anyone who thinks they are knowledgeable about the Allied Bombing campaign of WWII. The book dispels some myths and puts the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of strategic bombing in context to who the war was won and the Nazis defeated.