Military Principles

Posts dealing with discussions of the principle of the military art or Strategy, Operations, and Tactics

Military Uniforms

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As I was getting ready for work this morning I started thinking about military uniforms and what their purpose is. I have heard all the typical reasons such as discipline, Esprit de Corps, identification, distinctiveness, economy, and of course, uniformity. The more I thought about it the more it hit me that the main reason for a uniform and also the most practical one to my mind is that of battlefield identification or simply being able to tell friend from foe. I think the discipline and Esprit parts of having a uniform are natural outgrowths but are not essential as elements. Uniforms have been around for literally thousands of years … More after the Jump…

Book Review: On Roman Military Matters by Vegetius

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This little tome by the Roman scholar Flavius Vegetius Renatus was written sometime in the 5th Century A.D. and is known by several titles, the original Latin title is De re Militari but is variously known as the Epitome of Military Science and On Roman Military Matters, the copy I have uses the latter title. This is one of the few works that survived from antiquity in continuous publication, if you will. It was used as a text on military operations throughout the Middle Ages and has survived to this day. Just about every king, noble, and military leader of the Middle Ages had a copy of this book and … More after the Jump…

The American Way of War – My Opinion

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The American Way of War was introduced as a concept by Russell Weigley in his book of the same name during the early 1970’s.   Essentially the theory runs that America attempts to totally dominate her enemies in war thus ending the war.   The American method of achieving this during and since World War II has been through the judicious application of firepower; that is, overwhelming force directed against an enemy. American doctrine as it developed during and after World War II stresses the use of maximum force at the point of decision.   This is not much different from other nations doctrine, what makes it different is the … More after the Jump…

Tilting at Windmills: What the Hell is Obama, NATO, and the West Doing in Libya?

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I have been pondering this one for a while now.  What exactly, is the west trying to accomplish in Libya?  I have posted on this before here and here, and I am still puzzled as to what we are trying to accomplish in Libya, protect so-called innocent civilians or topple Qaddafi’s regime? The stated goal of the administration is to protect civilians in line with the UN Security Council resolution # 1973, but the way in which the air campaign is being waged certainly makes it seem as if toppling Qaddafi is the goal of the bombing.  Their were intense air attacks yesterday, and one of his son’s was killed … More after the Jump…

The Fronts of World War I in 1915 & 1916

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After Turkey’s entry into the war towards the end of 1914, the Dardanelles was closed to allied shipping and thus the only warm water route to Russian ports was closed.   The allied solution to this dilemma was to use the powerful British Navy in concert with a French battle group to force the Dardanelles and reopen the route to the Black Sea.   This operation gained added impetus with the massive Russian losses suffered in the previous year and because of the Turkish opening of a new front against Russia along their common frontier in the Caucasus. The first naval attempt to force the Dardanelles in February 1915 ended … More after the Jump…

The Opening Months of World War I in the East and Elsewhere

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The opening months of World War I on the Eastern Front did not proceed at as the German General Staff thought they would.   When General Alfred von Schlieffen (1833-1912) was drawing up the German war plan that would subsequently bear his name, he made several assumptions about the Russian army that would prove to be false. The most glaring incorrect assumption was the Germans estimate of the time it would take the Russian army to take the offensive.   The German General Staff assumed it would the take the Russians at least forty days to complete mobilization and begin their offensive.   This was the amount of time they … More after the Jump…

Sun-Tzu, Clausewitz, and Naval Warfare

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The work of neither Sun Tzu nor Clausewitz is adequate to describe naval warfare except in the most general terms. While it is true that until recent times warfare on both land and sea was largely two dimensional, there are factors at work in naval warfare that defy explanation in either Sun Tzu or Clausewitz. The vagaries of wind and weather played a much greater role in medieval naval warfare than on land. The weather was often a determining factor in whether an engagement happened at all. The naval commander was at the mercy of the weather during the age of sail, something that ground commanders did not have to … More after the Jump…

The Opening Months of World War I in the West

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This will be a series of posts laying out the general history of the major Fronts in World War I. The First World War was unnecessary in that if the diplomats of Europe had truly wanted to stop the war there was ample opportunity in the five weeks between the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the start of the fighting.[1] The outbreak of war in 1939 can be directly traced to the terms of the Peace dictated at Versailles in 1919, and World War II was incomparably more destructive than World War I both in terms of lives lost and property destroyed. It was fashionable in the aftermath … More after the Jump…

Combatant Military Strategic Thought in 1914

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All classical military theorists point out that military strategy and national policy are intermingled.   Clausewitz devotes a lengthy portion of his treatise to the ways in which military action should serve the needs of the state; indeed, his most famous quote concerns politics and war.   Most of the combatants in World War I seem to have forgotten that policy drives strategy. When the Elder Moltke was Chief of the German General Staff, German war-plans and policy neatly interlinked however, during Schleiffen’s tenure as Chief of the General Staff that link between policy and strategy was lost.   The Great Memorandum of 1905 ignored political reality in favor of … More after the Jump…

Why the Western Front Stalemated in WWI

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The conventional explanation for why the Western Front in World War I settled into a stalemate is that the power of defensive weapons was stronger than the offensive methods employed.   The theory is that the defensive potential of machine-guns, artillery, repeating rifles, and trenches was unbreakable with infantry and artillery alone.   This simplistic explanation does not suffice under close scrutiny though.   If this were so, why were the Germans not stopped in France until after they had removed troops to the Eastern front for the Battle of Tannenberg and why were the French stopped cold when they attempted to invade Germany in August 1914? The reasons for … More after the Jump…

Book Review: The German Way of War by Robert M. Citino

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This book is an interesting read to say the least, Dr. Citino makes the case that there is a specifically German “way of war”. That way, is what he calls operational maneuver. He traces the development of this “way of war” from the 17th century battles of the Frederick William I, the “Great Elector” of electoral Brandenburg and scion of the Hohenzollern Dynasty through to the end of World War II and the final defeat of Nazi Germany. I am not myself so convinced that the discussion should end there based on my experience talking to current German soldiers about war and battle during partnership exercises while I have been … More after the Jump…

Ancient Roman Military Equipment according to Polybius

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Polybius provides a detailed description of Roman Legionary equipment in Book VI of his Histories. He begins by describing infantry equipment and then describes the equipment of the cavalry and auxiliaries in turn. This post will concentrate on his description of the equipment worn by the four classes of citizen infantry velites, hastatii, princeps, and triarii. The velites were light troops or skirmishers. They were equipped with a plain helmet, sword, javelins, and a shield called a parma. According to Polybius, the shield was round and about 3 Roman feet in diameter. The javelins were also 3 Roman feet long and had an iron point made such that it was … More after the Jump…

Courtesy Patrols Outside Fort Benning

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Drudge has a link up to this story about the military instituting Courtesy Patrols (CP) in downtown Columbus, Georgia just outside the gates of Fort Benning. The story itself is very balanced and explains what a CP is what they will be doing quite well I think. I personally am in the military and have both seen and had to act as a CP during my time in the military. They are nothing remarkable. As the story makes clear, the CPs have no legal standing with regards to people who are not in the military. They do have however, and can execute, command authority over members of the military who … More after the Jump…

The German Way of War?

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Is there such a thing? That question hit me this morning as I was reading a book review in an old copy of the Journal of Military History. The book in question was Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (Modern War Studies), by Robert M. Citino and it was reviewed in the January 2009 issue of the Journal. The reviewer made mention that one of the prevalent theories about the German army is that in World War II they fought a completely different war than the one they were designed for and that goes far to explaining the ultimate German defeat. The argument is that the German … More after the Jump…

Ancient Roman Military Camp Layout according to Polybius

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Polybius provides a detailed description of the layout and organization of a Roman Legionary Camp in Book VI of his Histories. Rather than try to rewrite everything in the section on the layout of a Roman camp contained in Polybius, I have just posted the actual text. I took the text from Bill Thayer’s excellent site at Lacus Curtis. He uses an older translation than the one I have at home, and it differs at some points. The only thing I have done to the text is edit it a little for clarity and added emphasis to some words, mainly putting most of the Latin titles in italics. I also … More after the Jump…

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