The Battle of Jena-Auerstädt: 14 Oct 1806

Posted on February 19, 2012 by Patrick Shrier

The Battle of Jena-Auerstädt was fought in Germany on 1806 between the French Imperial Army and the Prussian Royal Army. It is actually two separate battles separated by about twenty miles. Both the French and Prussian armies were split leading to two separate engagements one was fought by Napoleon and Davout commanded the French Corps at Auerstädt. The battle at Jena was the larger of the two as far as forces involved are concerned but the action at Auerstädt was operationally the more decisive. Combined, the Prussians suffered a devastating defeat that they could not recover from and led to the virtual surrender of the kingdom in the face of Napoleons demands at Tilsit a little over three months later. It is simpler to look at the two engagements separately and then talk about the way the twin defeats affected the Prussians and French. One of the important things about the battle is the impetus to reform given to the Prussians after their defeat. They went to war against Napoleon in 1805 with an army that was essentially unchanged in structure and doctrine from the one Frederick II had used fifty years previously during the invasion of Silesia and Seven Years War.

Relative locations of the engagements on 14 Oct 1806

I will discuss the Battle at Jena to begin with. Not only were there more forces engaged there, that was where Napoleon was in command. Some sources claim Napoleon displayed his typical brilliance at Jena, I am not so sure. The fighting at Jena began early in the morning and continued through the afternoon. The Prussians pressed attacks home but they were continually thrown back by French artillery fire. The Prussians also suffered from the effect of the fire from French skirmishers.1 The decisive moment at Jena was when several commanders of the Prussian left were killed or wounded. This led to the collapse of that flank and after that it was all over except for the crying as the saying goes. The French pressed their advantage and this led to a Prussian retreat all along their front that quickly started to look like a rout, especially once the French cavalry started attacking and pursuing the retreating Prussians.

The battle at Auerstädt some 12 Kilometers north of the main battle at Jena was a slightly different affair but the results in the end were the same. At Auerstädt, the Prussians actually had numerical superiority and could have perhaps avoided complete defeat if their senior commanders had actually worked together instead of at cross purposes. Marshall Davout commanded the French forces and he handled his troops extremely well. He was also assisted by the overall greater unity of command in the French army. Davout achieved a defensive victory and then followed it up with an offensive late in the day that caused the Prussian army to essentially rout and leave the field in a rush.

The Prussian army was pretty much destroyed as a fighting force after Jena-Auerstädt. The French literally had their way with Prussia over the next two months as the remnants of the Prussian army fought several small delaying actions as the bulk of the army attempted to escape to the east and safety in Russia along with the Prussian king. That destruction, wand the consequent elimination of Prussia from the Second Coalition was the greatest effect of the battle. The long-term consequence was that Prussia significantly reformed their army and was in a position less than seven years later to be instrumental in the final coalition to defeat napoleon both in the 1813 campaign and again at Waterloo at the end of the Hundred Days.

Resources:

A good resource with driving guides if you happen to visit the battlefield can be found at www.Napoleon.org

One of these days, I am going to actually take the time to drive the hour and a half from my house to the battlefield and do an in-depth analysis with photos. Nevertheless, like everything else, I am hampered by time. When I do, I will be sure to post an update to the relatively broad, operational/strategic analysis presented here. My real love is the tactical side of military history anyway.

1. Cark, Christopher, Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press 2006. 296-298

The Battle of Rorke’s Drift

Posted on January 28, 2012 by Patrick Shrier

The 1879 Battle of Rorke’s Drift is one of the most celebrated, and smallest battles in British history. It occurred in 18179 during the Zulu War in South Africa at the Mission and Supply Station of Rorke’s Drift. During the battle, some 179 British soldiers held off and defeated a force of over 4,500 Zulu warriors winning a eleven VC’s in the process.

The Battle itself occurred around Rorke’s Drift, a British mission station that had been converted to a logistics base and hospital by the British Army, it is located on the border between Natal Province in the colony of South Africa and Zululand. The battle occurred on the same day as the British defeat at the Battle of Isandlhwana on 22 January, 1879. Isandlhwana is one of the most inexplicanble British defeats, it is difficult to explain how over 1,000 rifle armed soldiers in a good defensive position were defeated by spear armed native warriors while Rorke’s Drift is the opposite. At Rorke’s Drift 139 identically armed soldiers defeated over 4,500 spear armed warriors. On the face of it, the Zulu’s should have been able to overwhelm the small British garrison even at the cost of horrendous casualties from British rifle’s. They the Zulus were defeated says more about the British than it does the Zulu warriors they faced.

Period Map of the Defenses at Rorke's Drift

The unit defending Rorke’s Drift was B Company of the 2nd Battalion, 24th regiment of Foot. They had hastily prepared the mission station for defense by erecting barriers of grain sacks called “mealie” bags to form a perimeter around the station’s two stone buildings and encompassing a stone kraal inside the perimeter. They also knocked out firing ports, or loopholes, in the stone walls of the buildings themselves.

The majority of the Zulu warriors were armed with spears but some had muskets and rifles. They were poorly trained in the use of the firearms they had though. The battle started around 1630 when a small column of some 500, Zulus approached the perimeter from the south. At that point the British opened fire at long range but the Zulus pressed their attack. The Zulu continued their attack and the main force eventually came up and began attacking near the hospital.

Around 1800 the Zulu’s finally managed to break into the hospital and began to spear the wounded soldiers there. The British fought back but the relentless pressure of the Zulus continual attacks eventually drove them from the hospital building into the inner courtyard and Kraal that was there. The British continued to withdraw and by 2200 the British had withdrawn to their final perimeter around the storehouse. Zulu attacks continued until approximately 0400 when the final push against the British position was repelled.

As dawn broke the British began to police up the battlefield but quickly maned their positions at 0700 when some Zulu warriors were spotted. These did not attack the outpost but continued away from the battlefield. AT 0800 the British relief force arrived and there were no more attacks or sightings of the enemy.

Of the 139 British defenders 17 had been killed and 10 wounded in the attack. Zulu casualties are estimated at 500 killed and an unknown number of wounded from a force of approximately 4,500.

11 Victoria Crosses were awarded to British soldiers after the battle, they went to:

Lieutenant John Rouse Merriott Chard, 5th Field Coy, Royal Engineers
Lieutenant Gonville Bromhead; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot
Corporal William Wilson Allen; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot
Private Frederick Hitch; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot
Private Alfred Henry Hook; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot
Private Robert Jones; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot
Private William Jones; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot
Private John Williams; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot
Surgeon James Henry Reynolds; Army Medical Department
Acting Assistant Commissary James Langley Dalton; Commissariat and Transport Department
Corporal Christian Ferdinand Schiess; 2nd/3rd Natal Native Contingent

This is the highest number of VCs awarded to a single regiment for a single action but was not the highest number of VC’s awarded in a single action, that happened at the Second Relief of Lucknow, which occurred from 14–22 November 1857.

Some additional resources about the battle: http://www.rorkesdriftvc.com/, http://britishbattles.com/zulu-war/rorkes-drift.htm, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/victorians/zulu_01.shtml, and http://www.historyofwaronline.com/ZuluWar.html

Book Review – Iron Kingom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947 by Christopher Clark

Posted on November 13, 2011 by Patrick Shrier

This massive tome lays claim to being a complete history of Prussia, and if he doesn’t achieve it, he doesn’t miss it by much. It is fairly large at over 700 pages but Dr. Clark has a pleasant writing style that makes the book easy to read. He is not so much recounting events as using the historical events to tell the story of Prussia.

The book opens with the retelling of the Allies abolishment of Prussia as a political unit in 1947 then goes right to the beginning of Prussia with the establishment of Prussia as a political unit under German sovereignty under the Great Elector in the years just prior to the Thirty-Years War. He follows the history of Prussia from its initial conquest by the Teutonic Knights to its incorporation as part of Brandenburg during the Reformation and the conversion of the Knights to Lutheranism. He then traces the the way in which the Elector of Brandenburg got the rights to call himself King in Prussia to King of Prussia and eventually Emperor of Germany.

Almost half the book covers the history of Prussia from the Napoleonic Wars onward. This makes it a little unbalanced in my opinion, but it is also understandable as there are many more records from then forward and it is easier to know what happened. I especially like that the author refuses the temptation to speculate on the might-have-beens as I call them. He points out events that he thinks were pivotal but does not devote space to discussing the what-ifs had different decisions been made. He presents a straightforward recitation of the events of Prussian history in an entertaining manner that also lets the reader make up his own mind about causes because the retelling of events themselves are extremely well balanced.

In conclusion, Dr. Clark has written what is perhaps the best one-volume history of Prussia I have found. I especially liked it’s focus on Prussia as being the dominant factor in German history, and it was. This is an extremely readable book that is useful to both academics and non-academics alike. It should be on the bookshelf of anyone who considers himself a student of German history.

Battle Analysis-Sedan, 1870

Posted on November 6, 2011 by Patrick Shrier

The Battle of Sedan, fought on 1 September 1870 displayed the superiority the Prussian Army had attained over the French in the nearly sixty years since their devastating defeat at Jena in the Napoleonic wars. The battle was notable for several developments in warfare, which were showcased by the Prussian and French army’s different abilities to effectively utilize the new technologies and methods existing. The most dominant military technologies of the time were railroads, repeating rifles, and modern cannon.

Map of Battle of Sedan - Image Courtesy: http://www.marxists.org/glossary/events/f/pics/sedan.gif

While the French had at their disposal the Chassepot rifle which was superior to the Prussian needle-gun, their artillery was inferior in both quantity and quality to the Krupp guns deployed by the Prussians. The Prussians made superior use of the railroad in the deployment of their armies but that had little to do with their successful encirclement of the French army at Sedan, as the Prussians had largely been road bound and foot marching since crossing the French frontier at the beginning of August. The French failures of command and poor planning prevented them from retreating from Sedan thus forcing them to stand and fight the numerically superior Prussian army.

The Germans under Moltke proved to be energetic in their attacks and ruthless in the use of their superior artillery to bottle up the French and prevent their movements within the Sedan pocket. As the German armies approached Sedan, Moltke ordered his corps to probe the French and begin to march to encircle the French in the city. The Prussian armies quickly attacked to force crossings of the Meuse at Bazailles and Donchery. After the Prussians forced the crossing of the Meuse on 31 August, they moved rapidly to complete the encirclement of the French Army of Chalons and by that evening, the French were surrounded.

Like many battles of the war, the Prussians joined battle on the next morning not through any plan but through the actions of a lone commander acting on his initiative. At around 0430 on the first, the I Bavarian Corps mounted an attack to retake the bridge at Bazailes. As the Saxons moved up on the Bavarians flank in the early morning, they emplaced their artillery and began to attack also. The engagement rapidly spread from there to become a general attack on the surrounded French Army.

The Prussians made excellent use of their artillery to force the French to halt movement within the pocket. The effectiveness of Prussian artillery was a foretaste of what modern quick-firing artillery could accomplish. The Prussian army continued to make frontal infantry assaults even in the face of the tremendous casualties inflicted by the French using their superior rifles. The Prussians could have just as easily dominated the pocket with their artillery and thus saved themselves many of the 9,000 casualties they suffered during the battle.

Strategically the Battle of Sedan was a masterstroke for the Prussians as it removed the last trained French field army from the war. There were operational errors committed by Prussian generals who ignored or imperfectly followed orders but overall The Elder Moltke was shown to have a superior grasp of strategy than his French opponents. The major errors on the part of the Prussians were in their tactical use of infantry, artillery, and cavalry. They suffered needless casualties by not using their larger gun-line equipped with superior weapons to dominate the French before committing their infantry to battle. They were saved by their larger numbers and the yeoman’s effort put forth by the better-trained gunners of the Prussian army.

The battle could have been won more cheaply if Moltke had had better control of his subordinates and thus better control of the timing for beginning the battle, the impulsiveness of the Prussians cost them needless lives. The Prussian army did not use true combined arms tactics but with a larger and more disciplined army, their mistakes were not as detrimental to success as were the mistakes of the French.

Book Review: The Age of Total War: 1860-1945 by Jeremy Black

Posted on October 5, 2011 by Patrick Shrier

The notion that a book is “thought-provoking” is often thrown out there for works of non-fiction, and of those that are described as such that I have read most very seldom are. This book is different, Dr. Black has written not so much a history as a treatise challenging historians, particularly military historians, to reexamine the history of conflict in the examined period with the idea of total war uppermost in their minds. It seems a counter-intuitive thing to do at first, but he provides plenty of examples of why the wars under consideration were not total or were only partially total at best. This includes World War II, which was total in some aspects but limited in others.

The biggest distinction the Dr. Black makes in discussing totality in warfare is the difference between war aims/victory conditions and the methods used to wage war. He posits that while war aims are sometimes total, such as seeking the destruction of the enemy or the dissolution of their state, the methods of war making have often been far from total. Even the most brutal of wars between nation states are often not total as the combatants do not actually seek the physical destruction of their enemies. He actually points out that it is most often revolutionary or sectarian conflicts where the physical destruction of opponents is a goal and uses the examples of Rwanda in 1994, 1990′s Bosnia, the German suppression of the Herero in the early 1900s, and many of the wars of decolonization in Africa and East Asia as examples, many of which fall outside of the period examined.

This is a global history of the period to an extent, but there is an emphasis on wars that occurred within Europe simply because so much more is known about them. He examines the conditions in these wars and discusses the ways in which they were and were not total. On of his most interesting discussions in the book is a wide-ranging discussion of fighting quality in his chapter on WWII and the way in which that aspect of the war has been under served in the literature.

He closes the book with a discussion of totality in the Cold War period and looking forward and the way in which the entire concept of total war needs to be reexamined and that military history needs to get away from just examining the wars of Europe but also look at the rest of the world. It is a telling observation that in English language history’s the rest of the world is virtually ignored unless a western nation was engaged in the conflict with Israel being the exception.

In closing, Dr. Black has produced a book that should inspire even the most casual of students of military history to reevaluate the way in which they think of total war. This book should be on the shelf of every student of military history but particularly that of those talking heads that go on news shows and fatuously offer their supposed wisdom about warfare for the masses. An excellent and yes, thought provoking book, I highly recommend it.